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ABSTRACT 
South-South cooperation has become one of the most powerful tools at the disposal of 
developing countries for integration into the global economy. South-South relations that 
gained momentum in the aftermath of the Cold War have demonstrated a radical departure 
from the now archaic modes of engagement characteristic of the Cold War era. A handful of 
developing countries have emerged as de facto leaders of the South. These are countries that 
have taken significant rhetorical as well as practical steps towards strengthening South-South 
cooperation, as a means to counter the global domination of the affluent states of the North.  
This research report investigates the Post-Cold war adaptation of South-South cooperation 
exemplified by China and South Africa, and how they cooperate in international fora, with 
focus on the United Nations and World Trade Organisation.  These are two countries that are 
strong advocates of South-South solidarity, and are regarded as leading powers of the 
developing world. Although with varying political and economic formations, the two 
countries have much in common. The most salient commonality is their evolving foreign 
policies. It is their evolving foreign policies that have enabled China and South Africa to take 
particular positions in international forums. There is significant commitment to the South 
agenda and this is demonstrated in UN and WTO engagements. However, there is ample 
room for improvement. Though committed to South-South cooperation, China and South 
Africa are still more committed to national interests. For South-South cooperation to move 
beyond rhetoric and periodic instances of cooperation there is an urgent need to redefine 
South-South cooperation. A new definition should involve a significant shift from the current 
abstract characterisation, to one that focuses on specific issues whose progress can be 
monitored and measured.  
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Chapter 1  
1. Introduction and Background. 
1.1 Background to the Study. 
The period following the end of the Cold War and the demise of superpower rivalry between 
the East and the West,  together with the rise of neo-liberal economic policies brought about a 
reconfiguration of the international system. This new international order is widely understood 
as dominated by the rich industrialised countries of the North, with the South becoming 
increasingly marginalised. The South has more than ever become a distinct geopolitical unit; 
striving to assert itself in the face of neoliberal dominance of the global economy. This 
struggle has led to the establishment or revival of regional groupings comprising countries 
from Asia, Africa and Latin America, the three continents that make up the South, in an effort 
to promote stronger and more effective South-South cooperation. It is within this context that 
South Africa and China have increased their rhetoric for stronger South-South cooperation. 
Beginning in the early 1990s, the newly emerging world order was largely shaped by the 
globalisation phenomenon1, globalisation itself given impetus by the major political and 
economic changes taking place. Indeed, this period can be described as an international world 
governed by principles of geo-economics. With debates raging about the costs and benefits of 
globalisation, the South led by China sought to partake in this new global order, not only to 
participate but also to restructure it and make it more just. This needed a concerted effort 
from all developing nations. This required commitment and elaborate organisation, and 
indeed strong political will from leaders of the developing world. Having the third biggest 
economy in the world and a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council, China 
has positioned herself as a de facto leader of the developing world.  
 
 
                                                            
1 Whiteman, K, and Yates, D. “France, Britain and the United States”, in Adekaye, A. and Rashid, I. (eds.), West 
Africa’s Security Challenges: building Peace in a Troubled Region, Lynne RiennaPublishers, Boulder&London, 
2004, p.374 
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China is redefining the concept of South-South cooperation; an idea that can be traced back 
to the 1960s, as an attempt by what was then the ‘Third World’, to establish self-reliance. 
This was partly a response to the dependency rhetoric of the 1960s, which asserted that 
developing countries were there to be exploited by the developed nations. 
In its redefinition of South-South cooperation, China has sought to stimulate greater political 
and economic cooperation among the countries of the developing South. With this vision, 
China has identified Africa, particularly South Africa as a strategic development partner in 
the hope of a more coherent and consistent South agenda. To a large extent the South has 
reciprocated positively to China’s advances.  
In the past decade South Africa has also become a major player in international affairs, and 
carries significant authority in regional and world affairs. On 31 December 2008 South Africa 
concluded its two-year term as an elected member of the United Nations Security Council2. 
The election was possible due to the country’s considerable economic capacity, as well as its 
political might. South Africa is regarded as a regional and continental hegemon and is 
therefore highly respected internationally. Regional powers by definition possess the will, 
means and ambition to conduct foreign policy in their own neighbourhood without close 
regard to the preferences of the United States or multilateral organizations, including the 
United Nations3. South Africa fits this description, and has come a long way since 1994, this 
was evident in the two years participating as an elected member of the Security Council. 
After the emergence of majority rule in 1994, South Africa has intensified its efforts as a 
significant actor in international affairs; this has seen the country flexing its muscles on 
certain occasions, particularly in multilateral forums. But most importantly, South Africa has 
been quite vocal in articulating the challenges of developing countries, especially African 
countries. Former President Thabo Mbeki was active in the revival of the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM) and the Group of 77 countries (G77). It is during these interactions that 
China and South Africa increasingly saw a convergence of interests, and the potential 
benefits of South-South cooperation. 
                                                            
2 Minister Dlamini-Zuma, “Statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the Conclusion of South Africa’s 
term as an Elected Member of the Security Council, Department of Foreign Affairs, at 
www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2009.szum0102,html. Accessed 05/01/2009. 
3 Fuller, G.E. & Arquilla, J. “The Intractable Problem of Regional Powers” in Orbis, Vol.40, Issue 4, 1996, 
p.609. 
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The new global order has compelled many developing countries to invest time and money in 
regional cooperation efforts. In the past ten to fifteen years there has been a proliferation of 
regional cooperation initiatives throughout the developing world, the common denominator 
mainly being the status of being ‘developing’ countries.  Gilpin notes, that today economic 
regionalism has reached flood tide, and is having a significant impact on the international 
economy4. 
The South has rigorously pursued cooperation initiatives; one of the most forward thinking 
schemes is the India Brazil South Africa Dialogue Forum also known as IBSA. This was the 
brainchild of the respective Heads of State, all three countries are middle-income countries, 
and can be regarded as hegemons in their respective regions, indeed in the  South as a whole. 
Other blocs working within the broader context of South-South cooperation include the G77+ 
China and the Non-Aligned Movement of which the IBSA countries are also members. It is 
in this backdrop that China-South Africa relations can be contextualised. 
The two countries’ cooperation at the United Nations (UN) and the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) should be viewed in light of the background presented above. The 
China-South Africa nexus is of great significance in overall South-South cooperation. Both 
countries adhere to the South-South doctrine and are some of the most vocal advocates of 
cooperation among developing countries; they can also be regarded as middle-power 
countries. With this history, commonalities and converging interests and strong bilateral 
relations, how has this cooperation actually advanced South-South cooperation? This 
research report seeks to trace this relationship at the multilateral level of the UN and WTO, 
and investigate how the two countries cooperate and what this has meant for South-South 
cooperation as a whole. Is it possible to draw conclusions about this relationship pertaining to 
South-South cooperation? 
1.2 Rationale of the study 
The rationale behind why this study is worthy of investigation in this dynamic field of 
International Relations are wide ranging. This study is important for several reasons, as it 
carries implications for the realisation of a new international order as envisaged by 
developing countries of the South.  
                                                            
4 Gilpin,R.: Global Political Economy, Princeton University Press, Princeton New Jersey, 2001, p.3 
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Stronger South-South cooperation has the potential to alter the current international political 
and economic order, and it is important to understand the various avenues at the disposal of 
developing countries that can be exploited to realise this end. 
In the second half of 2008, this study became even more imperative. Following the last G8 
summit in July 2008 held in Hokkaido, Japan, there have been interesting developments. 
China and South Africa are among the five countries of the South (G5) that will officially 
join the world’s richest countries the Group of eight (G8) to form the G13.Upon this 
announcement the G5 reiterated the importance of South-South cooperation, that it cannot be 
replaced by North-South relations5. It is therefore important to investigate further the role of 
countries such as China and South Africa in international affairs, as they are proving to be 
players of note, even among the rich industrialised countries of the North. 
This study needs to be taken seriously as it has the potential to generate knowledge that can 
lead to further research on the topic. Further studies can look at how leading developing 
countries can balance their national interests while remaining committed to greater South 
cooperation. As argued elsewhere, the institutionalisation of South-South cooperation 
requires a re-examination of national policies of development in developing countries6. 
Indeed, developing countries have to make the necessary domestic changes in order to be in a 
position to actively engage the outside world. 
Focusing on the UN and the WTO is crucial in assessing the extent to which this relationship 
contributes to the overall South agenda. Both countries have articulated a desire to reform the 
two world bodies, in order to be more reflective of the current global make up. 
 The UN is an institution in which international political dynamics are played out. The UN is 
chosen in this study as one of the major world political bodies, where matters concerning 
international politics are deliberated. Power dynamics are also most evident at the UN, where 
an array of countries is represented. There is the General Assembly and the all-powerful 
Security Council with only five permanent members, China happens to be one of the five 
                                                            
5 Jaura, R. G8: Add Another Five- In a Way, at http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=43166, Accessed 
15/08/2008. 
6 Yaker, L. South-South cooperation and the NIEO: the institutional problem, in B.T.G. Chidzero and Gauhar, 
A. (eds.), Linking the South, The Route to Economic Cooperation, Third World Foundation, London, 1986, 
p.233 
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permanent members, and this is important for the purposes of this study. South Africa on the 
other hand is campaigning to be the first African country to occupy a permanent seat in the 
Security Council; this ambition was reinforced by the two year stint as a non-permanent 
member of the Council. All these factors make it particularly fascinating to see how the two 
countries cooperate in the UN. 
The WTO is the leading world body on international trade issues. International trade has 
become increasingly important for many countries; it has also become an arena of power 
politics7. For poor countries it provides the possibility to develop and prosper through global 
trade. This inevitability of international trade is a result of the dominance of free-market 
principles as prescribed by neo-liberalism8.This is precisely one of the main reasons why 
China finally became an official WTO member country on 11 December 2001, as it would 
have eventually found it increasingly difficult to do international trade on its own. 
1.3 Research question. 
In order to focus the study, specific research questions will be addressed in four of the six 
chapters. However, the overarching research question that this study seeks to answer is: how 
do China and South Africa as middle-powers cooperate in international fora, particularly in 
the UN and WTO, and whether this cooperation does, indeed, advance South-South 
cooperation?  
It is expected that this question will implicitly and explicitly reveal whether the two countries 
cooperate in international fora for their own ends or for the broader South agenda. The 
international forums are the best means in which to examine this relationship. Mindful of the 
fact that the West is in a minority in international organisations such as the United Nations9, 
the coming together of developing countries should be taken into consideration. 
 
 
                                                            
7 Payne, A. The Global Politics of Unequal Development, Palgrave, New York, 2005, p.196. 
8 Bond, P. “The World Bank and IMF reconsidered” in Coetzee, J.K. et al (eds.), Development: Theory, Policy 
and Practice, Cape Town, Oxford University Press, 2001, p.232 
9 Taylor, I. “China’s foreign policy towards Africa in the 1990s, in The Journal of Modern African Studies, 
Vol.36, No.3, 1999, p.451. 
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1.4 Aims of the study. 
This paper has several aims, as it tries to establish and explore China and South Africa in the 
context of South-South cooperation. As two regional powerhouses and strong advocates of 
altering the international order through stronger cooperation among countries of the South, it 
is important to track the countries’ record of cooperation in international fora.  
The first and most important aim is to assess the extent of cooperation between China and 
South Africa in two of the worlds’ biggest multilateral forums, the United Nations and the 
World Trade Organisation. Is there noteworthy cooperation between the two countries? If 
there is, how significant is it? And what kind of issues do they cooperate on; the writer will 
look at the issues on which the two countries cooperate. 
Second, this paper aims to assess whether cooperation between the two countries on these 
forums does, indeed, contribute to a stronger South with more clout and a louder voice in 
international issues. Here the aim is to establish whether the countries cooperate for their own 
ends or for the broader South. This should establish whether South-South cooperation is still 
at the level of political rhetoric by leaders or has it evolved into a strong policy tool for 
developing countries to use in their engagements with the rest of the world. 
Third, this study aims to understand the role of middle-income or semi-peripheral countries 
such as China, South Africa, India and Brazil in driving the South agenda. It is these 
countries that have been at the forefront of advocating change in the international system. 
These countries have become the de facto leaders of the rest of the developing world. There 
are several characteristics that make these countries the leaders, and this is worthy of further 
investigation in understanding the nuances of the developing world.  
Finally, the paper aims to locate this study in the burgeoning literature and debates that exist 
regarding South-South cooperation. A considerable amount has been written about this 
relationship; however, there are gaps in the existing literature. No extensive study has 
attempted to look at how these countries cooperate in international forums, particularly the 
UN and WTO. When this is attempted it is always done in a cursory manner, and not 
necessarily through a thorough investigation of contextualising the cooperation in South –
South cooperation. 
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1.5 Methodology. 
This study is to a large extent qualitative in terms of the research methods that have been 
used to gather information. In essence, this means this study has not relied on numerical data. 
A variety of sources have been used in the study, mainly literature. Sources used have 
assisted in unpacking concepts such as South-South cooperation and middle-income 
countries. 
The research topic required that a large amount of literature be consulted in addressing the 
topic and answering the research questions. Primary and secondary sources were used 
throughout this study. Secondary sources include the bulk of the literature, i.e. books, 
journals (articles), newspapers, and magazines. Primary sources include official government 
documents and information gathered from personal interviews. 
The Wits libraries have been of great assistance in the gathering of information. The library 
holdings have extensive sources of information available in various forms. Wartenweiler and 
William Cullen libraries on the East Campus have vast literature on China-Africa and China-
South Africa relations, and on the African Political Economy, including South Africa.  
The Jan Smuts library which is situated at the South African Institute of International Affairs 
(SAIIA) is a goldmine in terms of sources relating to China and Africa. The library also has 
several journals on South-South cooperation, as well as United Nations documents, these can 
only be obtained from this library. 
The library electronic resources have been heavily relied upon. Some of the most 
comprehensive journal databases can be accessed via the Wits library electronic database; 
these include JSTOR, Sciencedirect and EBSCO Host. These databases, particularly JSTOR 
contain some of the most highly reputable scholarly journal in the social sciences. 
The internet has been a great source of data gathering, particularly on current affairs. Online 
newspapers have provided up-to-date data. 
The main sources of primary data are interviews. These individuals were approached and 
contacted electronically via e-mail or telephonically. These are individuals with sizeable 
knowledge of the topic; indeed, some are experts in their fields of study. The three interviews 
conducted were with Dr. Garth le Pere executive director of the Institute for Global Dialogue 
16 
 
in Midrand; Dr. le Pere granted me an hour of his time at his office in Midrand. The second 
interview was with Sanusha Naidu, formerly with the Centre for Chinese Studies at 
Stellenbosch, she agreed to a telephonic interview as she is currently based in Cape Town. 
The final interview was with Paula Roque, formerly the project coordinator for China in 
Africa, at the South African Institute of International Affairs; I met with her in Pretoria. 
I will now briefly introduce each of the following five chapters; these chapters are arranged 
so that they best address the research questions as well as the aims of this study. And it is 
hoped that the information contained in each chapter does precisely that, through clear and 
informed analyses. 
Chapter 2 contextualises the study in a theoretical framework. This study requires a strong 
theoretical foundation in order to make sense of the concepts, particularly South-South 
cooperation, to understand the role of South Africa and China in this context. Functionalism 
is one of the theories used; the theory of the semi-periphery is the other. 
Chapter 3 examines a very important aspect, but one that could easily be overlooked, the 
foreign policy dynamic.  This is important because both countries’ foreign policies have 
evolved in the past two decades, largely influencing their outlook and behaviour in 
international fora. 
Chapter 4 looks at the background of China and South Africa in the UN. The chapter also 
considers the Non-Aligned Movement as one of the strongest and oldest political platforms of 
the South. Most critically, the chapter provides concrete examples of cooperation between 
China and South Africa in the UN. 
Chapter 5 focuses on the WTO process. The chapter traces China and South Africa’s 
background in the WTO. The chapter also considers the Group of 77 + China as the largest 
economic organisation of the South. The chapter also gives concrete examples of cooperation 
between China and South Africa within the WTO processes.  
Chapter 6 is the conclusion and recommendations. 
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Chapter 2 
2.  Theoretical Framework. 
“Whether applied to national or to international issues, functionalism is a political theory for 
a positive peace” Mitrany, D10. 
There are numerous International Relations (IR) theories and this is expressed in Stephen M. 
Walt’s article appearing in Foreign Policy “International Relations: One World Many 
Theories”11. The title and article imply the dynamic nature of the study of International 
Relations, and the various means in which it can be theoretically analysed. Particularly in IR, 
it is crucial to make sense of the different forms of relations and interactions that take place 
within the international system. Walt uses China as an example of a new development in 
international relations, that there is a need to make sense of China’s ascent, and that this can 
be done though various theories12. 
This chapter seeks to theoretically locate the dependent variable, which is South-South 
cooperation. The concept itself will be unpacked and analysed, this is important in order to 
fully understand the China-South Africa relationship in the context in which it is presented in 
this study. The writer will discuss two theories that are considered appropriate in 
understanding South –South cooperation. Functionalism and the theory of semi-peripheral 
countries will be explored. These will be discussed; special attention will be given on how 
they actually fit into this study.  These theories will serve as a point of reference for the rest 
of the study. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
10 Mitrany, D. A Working Peace System, an Argument for the Functional Development of International 
Organization, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1943. 
11 Walt, S.M. “International Relations; One World Many Theories”, in Foreign Policy, No. 110, Special Edition: 
Frontiers of Knowledge, 1998. 
12 Ibid, p.29 
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2.1 South-South cooperation 
It is generally believed that the notion of South-South cooperation gained prominence shortly 
after the process of decolonisation, when formerly colonised states became independent. 
Most of these countries were in the global South, particularly in the two continents, Africa 
and Asia. Reflecting on the state of cooperation among countries of the South, Ajit Singh 
notes that the economic emergence of the South has been one of the most important 
developments in the half century since the end of the Second World War13. The concept has 
evolved over the years, gaining as well as losing momentum over time, depending largely on 
current conditions in the global economy. In the mid 1980s it became increasingly vital for 
the South to act in unison and solidarity with each other to the benefit of both their own 
people and the international community as a whole14. 
Many indicate the 1955 Bandung Conference as one if the key events that shaped the South-
South discourse. The conference saw the biggest gathering of developing countries, many of 
whom had just gained independence, mostly from Asia, but Africa was also represented. At 
the time African countries were still under colonial rule, with only a few years to 
independence. The conference stressed the urgency of promoting economic development and 
cooperation15, among other things. The newly independent Asian states were facing acute 
economic difficulties, and African countries were to face the same if not worse difficulties in 
the following years. 
The collective self-reliance of developing countries16 is central to South-South cooperation. 
Collective self-reliance proposes that developing countries determine their own growth and 
development paths by increasing their cooperation with each other in key areas of 
                                                            
13 Singh, A. “South-South Cooperation: A Historical Perspective” at Singh, A. “South-South Cooperation: A 
Historical Perspective”, at www.southcentre.org/publications/policyforum/policyforum_11.htm  Accessed 
21/04/2008. 
14 Yaker, L. “South-South cooperation and the New International Order: the institutional problem” in Chidzero, 
B. and Gauhar, A. (eds.) Linking the South, The Route to Economic Cooperation, Third World Foundation, 
London, 1986, p.233. 
15 le Pere, G. and Shelton, G.: China, Africa and South Africa, South-South co-operation in a global era, 
Institute for Global Dialogue, Midrand, 2007, p.69. 
16 Patel, S. “Collective Self-Reliance of Developing countries” in The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol.3, 
No.4, 1975, p.569. 
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development. The distinguished economic historian, Surendra Patel argues that over time, 
developing countries have built up much strength; however, what has been problematic is the 
lack of linkages between these countries17. Such linkages are the key to complimentary 
cooperation, as well as for maximising potential benefits from this cooperation. 
After losing much currency throughout the 1960s, South-South cooperation made a 
comeback in the mid to late 1970s.The main reason for this comeback was the economic 
shocks that the world was experiencing following the oil crises. The revival of the South 
agenda was embodied in what was called the demand for a New International Economic 
Order (NIEO). The NIEO was a series of specific demands and considerations embodied in 
an impressive range and number of official documents18. The demand for a NIEO was a 
specific call for a review and restructuring of international economic relations. The context in 
which this emerged was of course the oil crises, as well as the increasing marginalisation of 
countries that were at the time referred to as the Third World or developing countries. The 
call for a NIEO was also seen as a dialogue between the North and the South, in an effort to 
allow the latter into the global economy on just terms. 
Although not necessarily pursuing self-reliance, the call for a NIEO by developing countries 
is a significant instance of cooperation among countries of the South. 
However, in retrospect, it has come to light that this call for a NIEO was a fundamentally 
flawed exercise. This criticism can be located within the broader critique of South-South 
cooperation as a developmental doctrine for developing countries. South-South cooperation 
has been criticised for lack of organisation, and being too big on rhetoric while falling short 
on action. A fair criticism as the South has failed to reach the desired level of coordination, 
considering the years of existence of the concept, which is over a half century. Ul Haq, 
argues, that the South will not commit to any co-operative arrangements unless it is in its 
long term interest to do so19. The argument is that there has not been enough incentive for 
countries of the South to commit to Southern initiatives. The South has been heavily 
dependent on the North, and therefore has little confidence in cooperation with each other.  
                                                            
17 Loc cit., p.581 
18 Cox, R.W. “Ideologies and the  New International Economic Order: reflections on some literature, in 
International Organization, Vol.33, No.2, 1979, p.258. 
19 Ul Haq, M. Beyond the Slogan of South-South Cooperation, in World Development, Vol.8, 1980, p.743. 
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Most of the South’s political, economic and intellectual ties are with the North; with many 
developing countries looking to their bilateral political ties with the North for their national 
security20. This has been one of the biggest challenges of South-South cooperation: creating 
trust and mutual confidence within the South. 
The failure of the NIEO initiative can be attributed to this ‘dependency’ on the North, and the 
decision to ‘negotiate’ with the North for a NIEO. The term ‘demanding’ is rather 
misleading, as the South was pleading with the North. At the end of the Cold War, it became 
apparent that there is not going to be a New International Economic Order. Critical of the 
NIEO negotiations, Ul Haq blames the South for assuming that a New International 
Economic Order will emerge from the benevolent generosity of the rich nations21. The South 
was criticised for not taking the initiative and coming up with a framework for a NIEO.  
This was precisely because of the fragmentation of the South mentioned above. The first 
mistake was the failure to restructure internally within individual states, then coordinate with 
each other within the South; this could have brought to the fore a more resolute agenda of the 
South; with the South speaking in one voice, and with greater collective bargaining at the 
international level22.  
After the Cold War, the South found itself in an even more precarious position vis- à- vis the 
international political and economic orders.  A new world order was emerging, and it was 
certainly not the kind that was envisaged during the call for a NIEO.  The 1980s has been 
called the “lost decade”, for developing countries due to the dismal failure of constructing a 
strong development agenda. 
The last decade of the 20th century saw remarkable changes within the South, but most 
significant was the revival of the South agenda. South-South cooperation was being revisited, 
or better yet, it was being redefined. There was an emergence of new actors on the global 
stage, and most of these actors were from developing countries.  
 
                                                            
20 Ul Haq, M. Op. Cit. 745. 
21 Ul Haq, M. Op. Cit. 744. 
22 Loc cit.   
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China has become the de facto leader of South-South cooperation, indeed, it has been noted 
that the rest of the developing world can learn from China’s experiences, both positive and 
negative23. This period also saw the ascent to international prominence of developing 
countries such as India, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, Turkey and others, assuming middle-
power status.  
In contrast to the countries of the 1970s that called for a NIEO, these countries had 
undergone and are still undergoing internal domestic transitions. It was generally accepted, 
that a new approach to strengthening South –South cooperation would of necessity involve a 
re-examination of national policies of development24. China in particular came out strong in 
calling for a restructuring of the international order, as it also suffered from the unequal 
international economic relations. The difference with previous proposals was that this call for 
a restructured international order was accompanied by robust debate and interaction within 
the South. This new group of South-South proponents was taking the initiative in framing the 
discourse for a more equal and just international system. 
It should ,however, be kept in mind that South-South cooperation is a broad concept, and that 
it is possible to break it down into smaller components. Sanusha Naidu argues that there is a 
need to understand the diffused nature of South-South cooperation25. The South is not a 
homogenous unit, but highly diverse and, indeed divided.  This paper will use the concept in 
its broad conceptualisation, and will discuss cooperation between China and South Africa at 
the macro level of South-South cooperation. This broad level at which cooperation occurs is 
expected to inform the conclusions reached in this paper. 
Over the years, South-South cooperation has manifested in different forums. Below will be a 
brief introductory overview of two of the most important South platforms that have emerged 
over the years. These are the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77, which is now 
known as the G77+ China. 
                                                            
23 Xiang, H. “China’s economic strategy: some guidelines for the South” in Chidzero, B. and Gauhar, A. (eds.) 
Linking the South, The Route to Economic Cooperation, Third World Foundation, London, 1986, p.211. 
24 Yaker, L. “South-South cooperation and the New International Order: the institutional problem” in Chidzero, 
B. and Gauhar, A. (eds.) Linking the South, The Route to Economic Cooperation, Third World Foundation, 
London, 1986, p.233. 
25 Naidu, S., Researcher, Southern African Regional Poverty Network, HSRC, formerly with The Centre for 
Chinese Studies, Telephone interview with the author, 15/11/ 2008. 
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2.1.1 The Non-Aligned Movement. 
The NAM is made up of 118 developing countries and aims to represent the political 
economic and cultural interests of developing countries. The NAM traces its origins to the 
meeting of 29 Asian and African countries in 1955 in Bandung, Indonesia. At this meeting, 
Heads of State discussed common concerns, including colonialism and the influence of the 
West26. Six years later after Bandung, the first NAM summit took place in Belgrade, 
Yugoslavia. NAM emerged at the height of the Cold War between the superpowers. The 
threat to world peace presented by the United States and the Soviet Union dominated 
proceedings. The meeting ruled that member countries could not be involved in alliances or 
defence pacts with the main world powers27. Therefore, NAM sought to prevent its members 
from becoming pawns in the Cold War and to distance themselves from the Western and 
Soviet power blocs. 
The NAM has over the years has been one of the main platforms of expression for countries 
of the South, particularly on political matters, and its voice has been loudest in the United 
Nations General Assembly. In the 1990s the Movement experienced a revival; this was in the 
midst of a new emerging international order, which saw further marginalisation of the South. 
This revival was spearheaded by countries such as South Africa and China, among others. 
The Movement was no longer concerned with the Cold War, but with the new political 
realities of a post Cold-War period.  In 2006, UN Secretary-General Kofi Anan noted the 
relevance of NAM, he reflected on the problem of income disparities between the world’s 
poorest and richest countries. He stated that “the collective mission of this Movement is more 
relevant than ever”28. 
 
 
 
                                                            
26 “Profile: Non-Aligned Movement”, BBC News, at 
newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/co, Accessed 26/11/2008.  
27 Loc cit. 
28 Anan, K. “ Secretary General says Non-Aligned Movement’s mission more relevant than ever in light of 
growing gulf between rich and poor countries” at www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sgsm10636.doc.htm 
Accessed 26/11/2008. 
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2.1.2 The Group of 77 + China. 
Another important constellation of developing countries is the G-77, which was formed in 
1964 in order to advance a common platform in the UN and its Economic and Social Council, 
which specifically addresses issues of trade and development29. The G-77 in particular, has 
been one of the major voices representing developing country needs at the WTO. The G-77 
also led to the establishment of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), which aimed to represent issues of trade for developing countries and to enable 
these countries to handle trade negotiations. Since its establishment in the 1960s, the group 
has been largely working within UNCTAD. 
However, in the period leading to and after the end of the Cold War, with the emergence of a 
new set of international political and economic circumstances, the G-77 became more 
autonomous and outspoken as well as decisive in its activities within the WTO. This has been 
possible because the ranks of the G-77 have grown to 132 countries and China has been 
added, although not as an official member country. The G-77+ China have established a very 
important mechanism for improving South-South trade30. The more robust nature of the G-
77+ China has been transferred to the workings of UNCTAD. On behalf of the G-77+ China, 
UNCTAD has come to play a very important role in carefully evaluating aid and 
development issues. The G-77 + China are explicitly used for advancing stronger South-
South cooperation, particularly on trade related issues. 
Given the complexity of South-South cooperation, one of the ways in which it could be best 
understood is by locating it within a theoretical context.  Why is there a need for South-South 
cooperation? What purpose does such cooperation serve? These are the questions that should 
be kept in mind when contextualising South-South cooperation. 
 
 
 
                                                            
29 le Pere, G. and Shelton, G.: China, Africa and South Africa, South-South cooperation in a global era, Institute 
for Global Dialogue, Midrand, 2007, p93. 
30 Loc cit. 
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2.2 Functionalism. 
With the idea of collective self-reliance central to South-South cooperation, South –South 
cooperation is therefore viewed as performing a particular function for developing countries. 
Functionalism is one of the political science theories that explain cooperation among states31. 
In the 1970s the world economy was in intense agony since the War32, it became evident that 
there is great need for different and more effective solutions, particularly for the ‘Third 
World’. It became important to find the lines of collective self-reliance of developing 
countries, or increased cooperation among themselves33. There was a strong need for a 
mechanism that would carry out the function of a platform for developing countries of the 
South. The functional theory best illuminates the logic behind South-South cooperation. 
Functionalism has over the years stood defiantly against dominant theories such as the realist 
and liberal theories of international relations; and has maintained that there is more to 
international relations than the nation state. Mitrany, one of the foremost proponents of 
functionalism, argues that the functional approach could eventually enmesh national 
governments in a dense network of interlocking co-operative ventures34. Mitrany is certainly 
aware that his functional theory is the most fitting in explaining the nature of international 
relations. He argues, that the major principles of functionalism are that man can be weaned 
away from his loyalty to the nation state by the experience of fruitful international co-
operation, that international organisation arranged according to the requirements of the task 
could increase welfare rewards for individuals beyond the level achieved within the state35. 
 
 
 
                                                            
31 Mattli, W.: The Logic of Regional Integration, Europe and Beyond, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1999, p.40. 
32 Patel, S. J. “Collective Self-Reliance of Developing Countries” in The Journal of Modern African Studies, 
Vol.13, No.4, 1975, p.569. 
33 Patel, S. J. Op. Cit. p581. 
34 Mitrany, D.: The Functional Theory of Politics, Martin Robertson & Company Ltd., London, 1975, p.180. 
35 Mitrany, D. Op. Cit. p. x. 
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In his seminal work titled “A Working Peace System”, released shortly after World War 2, 
Mitrany explains functionalism in more detail. He argues, that functionalism is about 
organising governments along the lines of specific ends and needs and according to the 
conditions of their time and space36. This suggests that functionalism is a pragmatic approach 
to international organisation. Inherent to the functional theory is the idea that cooperation will 
lead to a peaceful world. That the functional approach would help the growth of such positive 
and constructive common work, of common habits and interests37. Mitrany appreciates the 
complexity of international relations, hence the proposal of A Working Peace System, which 
would compel states to develop common norms that would reduce the prospects of conflict. 
Two of the key themes of the functional theory are international equality and international 
security.  
On international equality, Mitrany argues that this seemingly disruptive and intractable aspect 
of international relations may well be tamed by specific functional arrangements which 
would not steal the crown of sovereignty while they would promise something for the purse 
of necessity38.  
There is an acknowledgement that states are not equal, and that this is reflected in the 
configuration of the international system. Mitrany reflects on how smaller states have found a 
voice in the United Nations since its formation, particularly when they come together. He 
argues that smaller states have a difficult time in the actual policy making processes in the 
UN, but that they have contributed to changes in the balance of power by often acting in 
regional groups39. Therefore, Mitrany proposes that inequality on the international stage can 
possibly be overcome through cooperation. 
For the purposes of this study, it is evident that the functional theory proposed by Mitrany is 
the one theory that comes close in explaining South-South cooperation. Though at times 
overshadowed by the dominant theories, functionalism has emerged as one of the foremost 
theories of international relations. 
                                                            
36 Mitrany, D.: A Working Peace System, An Argument for the Functional Development of International 
Organization, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1943, p.20. 
37 Mitrany, D. Op. Cit. p.27. 
38 Mitrany, D. Op. Cit. p.29. 
39 Mitrany, D.: The Functional Theory of Politics, Martin Robertson & Company Ltd., London, 1975, p.200. 
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According to China and South Africa, South-South cooperation is not an end in itself, rather a 
means to a more just and peaceful world. This is the goal proposed by the functional theory, 
particularly the ideas proposed by Mitrany in A Working Peace System. The idea that states 
will develop common norms in an effort to progress to a peaceful world; can be seen as one 
of the underlying principles of South-South cooperation. This rings true for countries of the 
South, that have more in common than not. 
On international security, Mitrany reflects on the two World Wars, and how they produced a 
natural outcry for the organisation of international security40. The two wars flagrantly 
exposed the lack of organisation for international security purposes. Mitrany attributes this to 
a lack of will to act together for common peace41. The fact that the Second World War even 
took place, illustrates the level of distrust and disunity in the international system, particularly 
at the time, and to a certain extent today still. Writing after the Second World War, Mitrany 
proposes functionalism as a means to counter the effects of such disunity. However, Mitrany 
cautions against interpreting security in its narrow sense of policing the world against the use 
of violence42. This is one of the areas where international cooperation is most difficult, with 
states finding it hard to leave their national security to regional or international groupings.  
International security is also one of the areas that the South is concerned with. The unilateral 
nature of some of the rich industrialised countries, such as the United States has left many 
countries feeling vulnerable. The United States has the power to undermine the decisions of 
the UN Security Council; this is a fact that has particularly perturbed the South, hence the 
desire to reconstruct the UN system. Both principles of international equality and 
international security are pertinent to this study.  
Following this theoretical contextualisation we can truly appreciate and understand the need 
for South-South cooperation, and possibly later in the study we can also understand China 
and South Africa’s motives in the UN and WTO.  International (in) equality is one of the 
founding principles of South-South cooperation. The marginalisation of the South from the  
 
                                                            
40 Mitrany D. Op .Cit.  p. 180 
41 Mitrany, D. Op. Cit. p.181 
42 Loc cit. 
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international economy and politics facilitated the establishment of South-South cooperation. 
Mitrany’s functional theory has aptly captured the essence of South-South cooperation, and 
puts in perspective the challenges of developing countries.  
Note: small states are measured in size and power. 
2.3 The Semi-Periphery. 
In contextualising South-South cooperation, it is crucial to take into account the kind of 
countries that have emerged as the main drivers of this initiative. In the literature on South-
South cooperation a discernible pattern emerges regarding the category of countries that are 
the driving force behind cooperation within the South. This study deems it necessary to locate 
this category of countries in a theoretical frame, to look at some of the characteristics of these 
countries, how they emerge and the role that they play on the global stage. One of the best 
ways in which to theoretically analyse these countries is through Immanuel Wallerstein’s 
notion of the ‘semi -periphery’. This approach will be useful particularly in analysing the role 
of China and South Africa, as both countries exhibit semi-peripheral characteristics. 
Analysing the positions of China and South Africa as semi-peripheral states will assist in 
answering some of the core questions of this study. 
The idea of the semi-periphery is derived from the world system theory postulated by 
Wallerstein, the theory itself a derivative of the dependency theory. The world system theory 
moves away from the stark bifurcation suggested in the dependency theory that merely 
distinguishes between the core and the periphery. In explicating the theory, Wallerstein 
argues, that the theory is based on the assumption, explicitly or implicitly, that the modern 
world comprises a single capitalist world economy43. The world system theory distinguishes 
between the core, semi-periphery and the periphery, and that these are parts within the 
broader world system. The main idea is that the world is an intricate system constituting parts 
and a whole. Wallerstein states that we need to understand the internal socio-economic 
profiles and distinctive politics of nation states, but that first we must situate them in the 
world economy; by situating them in the world economy we can then understand the ways in 
                                                            
43 Wallerstein, I.: The Capitalist World- Economy, Essays by Immanuel Wallerstein, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1979, p.53. 
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which various political and cultural thrusts may be efforts to alter or preserve a position 
within this world economy44. 
The notion of a semi-periphery emerged when Wallerstein questioned the conception of a bi-
modal system considering the unicity of the system45. This bi-modal system left Wallerstein 
with many unexplained ideas; he then built his conceptualisation on previous ideas of 
‘subimperial states’ and ‘go-between nations’. Wallerstein preferred the term ‘semiperipheral 
countries’ in order to underline the ways they are at a disadvantage in the existing world-
system, and to explicate the complexity of the role which semi peripheral states play within 
the system46. Indeed, it becomes more evident that the semi-periphery has a particularly 
complicated role within the world system. As an improvement from dependency theory, the 
semi-periphery allows world system theorists to escape stagnationism47, which confined the 
dependency school, but also to make sense of the dramatic economic development of the East 
Asian economies. 
According to Wallerstein there is a need to create a semi-periphery in the system, for political 
and economic reasons. He states, that a system based on unequal reward must constantly 
worry about political rebellion of oppressed elements48. In order to avert this rebellion, 
certain political means have to be created, such as the creation off ‘middle sectors’49. These 
middle sectors perform a certain function in relation to the core and the periphery; they act as 
a buffer zone between these two extremes. However, these middle sector countries tend to 
think of themselves as better off than the lower sectors rather than as worse off than the upper 
                                                            
44 Loc cit. 
45 Wallerstein, I.  Op. Cit.  p.68. 
46 Loc cit. 
47 Graaff, J. and Venter, D.: “Understanding the World System, in Coetze, J.K. et al (eds.) Development: 
Theory, Policy and Practice, Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 2001, p. 81. 
48 Wallerstein, I.: The Capitalist World- Economy, Essays by Immanuel Wallerstein, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1979, p.69. 
49 Loc cit. 
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sector. Economically, semi-peripheral countries are intermediate, because they are exploited 
by the more powerful countries, at the same time they exploit weaker peripheral countries50.  
As much as Wallerstein argues that the semi-periphery performs a stabilising role, it can also 
be argued, that this exploitation cycle could also be a source of instability. 
It is important to also keep in mind the diversity within the South, as mentioned earlier. The 
South is not homogeneous; there are clear differences in the levels of development as well as 
prosperity. Two distinct categories are evident, the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and 
middle-income countries. This distinction is clearly depicted when noting that the North-
South economic gap is narrowing for about a dozen countries but continues to widen for well 
over 100 others51. The dozen countries fall within the category of middle-income countries; 
the other 100 countries are at the very bottom according to the world system theory, and they 
suffer exploitation by the core and the semi-periphery. China and South Africa fall within the 
category of middle-income countries, but also within this category there is no uniformity. 
Middle-income countries are also diverse; China and South Africa are by no means of equal 
economic or political stature.  
2.4 Conclusion. 
There are three key aspects of functionalism that will be used going forward in this study. 
The first is what can be regarded as the fundamental aspect of the functional theory, the idea 
that cooperation is carried out for the sole purpose of performing a particular function. In this 
case, that function is the strengthening of the South, through closer cooperation in an effort to 
bring about a change in the international system. The second aspect of functionalism that will 
be carried forward is that international cooperation among states has more rewards than 
individual action. This applies more to countries of the South that have similar needs and 
circumstances. The third and final aspect that will influence the rest of this study is the notion 
that international cooperation is usually a response by governments to a set of conditions in a 
particular time and space.  
                                                            
50 Graaff, J. and Venter, D.: “Understanding the World System, in Coetze, J.K. et al (eds.) Development: 
Theory, Policy and Practice, Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 2001, p. 88. 
51 Broad, R. and Cavanagh, J. “Don’t Neglect the Impoverished South” in Foreign Policy, No. 101, 1995-1996, 
p.20. 
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Countries of the South have come together since South-South cooperation became an 
ideological expression and a response to an inequitable international system. 
It is important to keep in mind the ideas emergent from Wallerstein’s notion of a semi-
periphery. This theoretical analysis of middle-income countries is primarily based on the 
notion that the world economy is particularly complex and that there is a need for such 
countries to exist in order to counter the adverse effects of a world economy fraught with 
inequality. This is an important idea that will be constantly referred to in this study, in trying 
to understand China and South Africa’s motives in South-South cooperation. 
The existence of a ‘single world capitalist’ economy has compelled developing countries to 
participate in this economy, but on a more non-discriminatory basis. This is the desire of 
semi-peripheral countries. These semi-peripheral or middle-sector countries also have a 
functional role to play; they act as a buffer between the ‘core’ and the ‘periphery’. It can 
therefore, be argued that there is a kind of expectation from countries such as South Africa, 
China, India, Brazil in terms of South-South cooperation. Here we can see how functionalism 
and the notion of the semi-periphery present complementary theses.  
In subsequent chapters the two theoretical perspectives will help in understanding the role 
and behaviour of China and South Africa in the UN and WTO, not only these two countries, 
but other middle powers as well. 
In summary, this chapter has contextualised the idea of South-South cooperation by analysing 
and by examining theories that could help understand the South as a geopolitical unit. It was 
stated that the South emerged out of trepidation by newly independent developing countries 
in the late 1950s, as they found themselves deeply marginalised from the global economy.  
The functional theory placed South-South cooperation into perspective, by offering reason for 
countries of the South to come together. Wallerstein’s notion of the semi-periphery 
contextualises the function and purpose of middle-income countries such as China and South 
Africa. We can thus position China and South Africa into this world system that Wallerstein 
speaks of. In doing that it is apparent that they occupy specific positions and their actions 
through South-South cooperation and independently reflect a determination to alter their 
position within the world system. 
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What is problematic however, is the exploitative cycle that appears inherent in the world 
system theory. The seemingly inevitable exploitation of the periphery by both the core and 
semi-periphery raises serious questions for South-South cooperation, whose very purpose is 
to act as a vehicle for all countries of the South to engage on a more or less equal footing on 
the international stage. Most importantly, this component of the world system theory has 
serious implications for the role played by China and South Africa on the African continent.  
The next chapter primarily looks at the new international order that characterised 
international relations in the post Cold-War period. The chapter will also examine some of 
the domestic and international circumstances that compelled China and South Africa to each 
evaluate and adjust their respective foreign policies in order to suit the new realities. 
Functionalism and the idea of the semi-periphery will help to understand how the two 
countries’ foreign policies have evolved over time.  
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Chapter 3 
3.  The post Cold-War International Order and the evolving Foreign Policies of 
China and South Africa. 
3.1 The post-Cold War international order. 
The period following the end of the Cold War and the demise of superpower rivalry between 
the United States and the former Soviet Union together with the rise of neo-liberal economic 
policies brought about a reconfiguration of the international system. This new international 
order is widely understood as dominated by the rich industrialised countries of the North, 
with the South being increasingly marginalised. During this period, the South faced 
challenges ranging from integration into the global economy to chronic underdevelopment, 
particularly Africa. African countries have continued to struggle with a constant state of 
underdevelopment and rapidly deteriorating domestic political economies. Africa has been 
worse off than its Asian and Latin American counterparts. The South has more than ever 
become a distinct geopolitical bloc; suffering the same fate since the early 1990s, struggling 
to participate in the new global political economy.  
This chapter traces this new international order, but more specifically traces the foreign 
policies of China and South Africa. If we are to understand the rise of these two countries to 
international prominence, it is crucial to understand the domestic and international conditions 
that propelled them to their eminence.  
In the past decade South Africa has become a major player in international affairs, and carries 
a remarkable level of authority. This is due to the country’s considerable economic power, as 
well as its political and military capacities. South Africa is regarded as a regional and 
continental hegemon. Regional powers by definition possess the will, means and ambition to 
conduct foreign policy in their own neighbourhood without close regard to the preferences of 
the United States or multilateral organizations, including the United Nations52. South Africa 
fits this description, and has come a long way since 1994. After the emergence of majority 
rule in 1994, South Africa has intensified her efforts as an actor in international affairs; this 
has seen the country flexing its muscles on certain occasions, particularly at multilateral 
                                                            
52 Fuller, G.E. & Arquilla, J. “The Intractable Problem of Regional Powers” in Orbis, Vol.40, Issue 4, 1996, 
p.609. 
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forums. But most importantly, the country has been quite vocal in articulating the challenges 
of developing countries, especially African countries. Former President Thabo Mbeki was 
active in the revival of the Non-Aligned Movement and the G77+ China. It is during these 
interactions that the two countries increasingly saw a convergence of interests. 
The new global order has compelled many developing countries to invest time and money in 
regional cooperation efforts. The past decade has seen the founding of several initiatives by 
developing countries in an effort to penetrate the global economy.  Gilpin notes, that today 
economic regionalism has reached flood tide, and is having a significant impact on the 
international economy53, I would also argue that this is also impacting on how the 
international economy is governed.  
The South has rigorously pursued cooperation initiatives; one of the most progressive 
schemes is the India Brazil South Africa Trilateral Forum also known as IBSA. This was the 
brainchild of the respective Heads of State, all three countries are middle-income countries, 
and can be regarded as hegemons in their respective regions, indeed in the entire South. The 
IBSA forum is primarily concerned with trade cooperation between the member states, as 
well as increasing inter regional trade. Other blocs working within the broader context of 
South-South cooperation include the G77+ China and the Non-Aligned Movement of which 
the IBSA countries are also members. It is in this context that China-South Africa relations 
can be contextualised. 
It is always prudent to start off on a small scale. It is a widely held view, that inter-regional 
and intra-regional cooperation is one of the most crucial building blocks for stronger South-
South cooperation. In the past decade there has also been an increase in bilateral agreements 
between developing countries. South Africa has some of the largest number of Bi-national 
commissions with several developing countries, including China. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
53 Gilpin, R.: Global Political Economy, Princeton University Press, Princeton New Jersey, 2001, p.3 
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3.2 An Overview of China-South Africa relations. 
The China-South Africa nexus in South-South cooperation is of great significance, in fact it is 
among the most closely observed. China and South Africa have had a working relationship 
since during apartheid, this was maintained throughout under different guises, and was 
modified after 1994. This relationship began when China was led by Nationalists in the 1940s 
and continued during the communist regime under Mao. Despite the communist regime’s 
anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist stance, the apartheid government maintained relations 
with Beijing54.  
Beijing has always paid special attention to Pretoria. Throughout the years Beijing kept its 
ties with Pretoria more or less unaffected by its general anti-colonial tirade in Africa55. 
However, by the late 1950s, Pretoria was becoming increasingly nervous about the PRC’s 
solidarity with the colonially oppressed in the developing world56. The PRC’s support for the 
anti-colonial movement was most evident at the 1955 Bandung Conference in Indonesia. 
China’s encounters with representatives of liberation movements also began at Bandung, 
where its delegates, for example, met Moses Kotane of the African National Congress (ANC) 
as well as Algerians who formed part of a Maghreb observer delegation57. 
The Communist Party of China (CPC) had been openly supporting liberation movements in 
Africa, the party also has a history with the ruling ANC as well as the South African 
Communist Party. However, these never really flourished due to the PRC’s continued 
relations with apartheid South Africa. The CPC’s posturing towards liberation organisations 
including the ANC and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) were guided by the two issues: 
the ideological polemic as well as Taiwan’s position in the UN. With Taiwan a permanent 
member of the UN, winning support from the African bloc was crucial in replacing Taipei in 
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35 
 
the Security Council which Beijing managed to achieve in 197158. Throughout apartheid, 
Beijing had been strong with anti-apartheid rhetoric, despite noted clandestine economic 
relations with Pretoria. This suggests that China’s economic pragmatism is not a recent 
phenomenon, rather one that has characterised the country’s meteoric rise to powerhouse 
status since the 1970s. 
3.3 China and South Africa’s evolving foreign policies. 
3.3.1 Foreign Policy 
Foreign policy is arguably, the single most important policy of any modern nation-state, with 
the state being the main executor of this policy. A country’s foreign policy has implications 
for all its other policies. After the end of the Cold War, a new international order emerged; 
this new order had different dynamics and required the countries of the world to review their 
foreign policies, as well as foreign policy-making tools. With globalisation becoming the 
most salient and decisive determinant of international relations, this resulted in the emergence 
of different approaches to foreign policy. Vale and Mphaisha describe foreign policy as “the 
sum total of all activities by which international actors act, react and interact with the 
environment beyond their national borders”59. 
One of the most dominant approaches to international relations is political realism; in both its 
classical and neo-realist forms it emphasizes the international environment as the main 
determinant of state action. This means that in formulating foreign policy, states are reacting 
to the nature of the international environment. Therefore, the realist or neo-realist perspective 
assumes that foreign policy making consists primarily of adjusting the nation-state to the 
pressures of an anarchical world system60. This implies that all foreign policy decision 
makers are driven by the same need and therefore have the same approach to foreign policy 
making. However, the suggestion is not that foreign policies of states can be predicted or that 
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they are the same. Individual state policies will be country specific and multidimensional; the 
fundamental similarity is the notion of national interest. Because the goal and corresponding 
decision calculus of states are the same, the foreign policy making process of each can be 
studied as though it were a unitary actor61. The realist/neo-realist approach will help in 
understanding the evolution of China and South Africa’s foreign policies, as their policies 
will be analysed in the context of a changing international system. 
There are wide-ranging definitions of foreign policy goals and objectives. Traditionally, the 
objectives of a country’s foreign policy are those concerning security and welfare; however, a 
number of other objectives are also important, whether in support of these primary aims, or as 
independent goals62. The goals of foreign policy can be described as rooted firmly in the 
domestic as well as international environments. As Vale and Mphaisha argue, that, in 
actuality, foreign policy outcomes are shaped by both domestic and international factors63. 
Those who make foreign policy straddle the two environments; they stand at the point where 
the two worlds meet64.   
The outcomes of foreign policy have been debated for many years in international relations 
scholarship, and in most cases the answer is determined by one’s theoretical perspective. 
Marxists, Liberals and Realists see foreign policy through different lenses. The contending 
theoretical perspectives, point us to where the first analysis should occur: liberals look inside 
the state, realists to the international system, and Marxists to both65. All three approaches can 
in fact explain the four clusters of goals a government might seek to achieve in its foreign 
policy.  
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These are mainly, national security, the promotion of political and economic autonomy, the 
enhancement of public welfare and finally, the enhancement of status or prestige66. 
3.4 China’s evolving foreign policy. 
In the period before the end of the Cold War, China’s foreign policy towards Africa was 
largely determined by three factors: the Chinese model, the superpowers, and China’s Third 
World policy67. The Chinese model relates to China’s developmental model. The trajectory of 
China’s developmental experience has been something of a phenomenon, and China has felt 
that it is a model that could possibly be emulated by African countries and developing 
countries in general. The superpowers, relates to the Soviet Union and the United States, and 
China’s struggle against them, there can be no doubt that Africa occupied a central place in 
Chinese foreign policy and the U.S. and Soviet Union were important factors in it68. The third 
and final factor relates to China’s own identification with the Third World of Africa, Asia and 
Latin America69. China has always identified with the developing world, regardless of its 
potential as a major world power. All of these factors have formed an important part of 
China’s foreign policy, particularly China’s Africa policy even more so in the post Cold-War 
era. 
3.4.1 China’s post Cold-War foreign policy. 
In order to gain a good perspective of China-SA relations in the period following the end of 
east-west rivalry, it is necessary to understand the evolution of China’s foreign policy during 
this period, particularly the African component. In the immediate post-war period, Chinese 
relations with Africa were friendly but modest. A new generation of Chinese leaders were 
confronted with an increasingly complex and changing world. With the emergence of a 
unipolar world, dominated by the North, particularly the United States, China increasingly 
saw the United States as hardly a benign superpower. With the cold war over and 
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superpowers exiting Africa (rather unceremoniously). China saw Africa as a potential source 
of new markets and resources70, as well as a strategic partner in the new global 
circumstances. China maintained the position that in the ‘complicated’ international system, 
with the danger of an unrivalled Washington; it was imperative that China and the developing 
world support each other and work together to prevent the rise of this new hegemon71.  
Christopher Clapham argues that China’s irruption onto the African scene has been the most 
dramatic and important factor in the external relations of the continent since the end of the 
Cold War72. 
In the early 1990s, the PRC embarked on a restructuring of the country’s foreign policy. This 
was done in order to cope with the new international context and to be in a position to 
maximise potential gains. It is apparent that Africa occupies a crucial role in the PRC’s 
achievements of its foreign policy goals73. A strong argument can be made about Africa’s 
centrality to China’s foreign policy. The three main objectives of Beijing’s foreign policy: 
preservation of world peace and the promotion of justice, national reunification and economic 
development74, can be examined in the context of China’s relations with Africa. 
The first objective is significant for the purposes of this paper, as it relates to China’s 
alignment with developing countries in an effort to address issues facing the South. The 
Chinese Government 2006 White Paper titled “China’s African Policy” is a significant 
document as it provides a detailed outline of China’s proposed formula of engagement on the 
continent. The White Paper states that Africa encompasses the largest number of developing 
countries and is therefore an important force for world peace and development75. China is 
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aware of its converging interests with developing countries, particularly African countries, 
and the White Paper proposes a way of fully capitalising on these areas of convergence. 
South Africa is one of the countries that China has converging interests with on the continent 
as well as internationally. The cultivation of close relations with the rest of the developing 
world has motivated China’s quest for international prominence. Beijing perceives itself as a 
champion of global justice, and believes this will result from the building of a new 
international political order76. It is within this foreign policy framework that China has taken 
up the mission of reviving and strengthening South-South cooperation.  
The second objective of the PRC’s African policy is of great significance. This has to do with 
the issue of reunification and the One China policy. The PRC and Taiwan continue to 
compete for international recognition as the sole representative of the Chinese people. This is 
one foreign policy objective the PRC has pursued with vigour and determination. This was 
also the defining factor establishing China-South Africa diplomatic ties in 1998. Forming half 
of the Non-Aligned Movement membership and possessing almost one third of votes at the 
United Nations, the African continent has become a battleground for the recognition 
struggle77. The White Paper states that the Chinese government appreciates the fact that the 
overwhelming majority of African countries abide by the one-China principle, and refuse to 
have official relations and contacts with Taiwan and support China’s great cause of 
reunification78. This has been an important issue for the PRC, because the recognition 
struggle has implications for the country’s overall international standing. Full recognition 
allows the PRC to solidify its permanent membership on the Security Council among other 
things. 
The third objective of economic development has been the most salient of the PRC’s 
evolving foreign policy. In the past two decades, China has been experiencing unprecedented 
economic growth. Since the mid 1970s, China has been undergoing an internal process of 
domestic economic reform geared towards a more outward looking economic policy. It was 
not only in the 1990s that China started the reform process. Deng Xiaoping, Mao’s successor 
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initiated a series of reforms that touched and penetrated every sinew of Chinese society79. 
The dramatic end of the Cold War in the late 1980s together with the reforms that have been 
taking place made it possible for China to emerge as a notable actor in international affairs 
leading to soaring growth levels. 
As China’s economy continues to expand, its leaders who have been pragmatic and 
innovative have become confident in their country’s ability to influence international 
events80. It has been precisely because of the growing economy and increasing international 
eminence that China has ventured into Africa with a distinct form of engagement. China 
requires large quantities of resources and markets to sustain its rapidly growing economy; 
Africa’s relatively unexploited energy sources offer the Chinese a unique opportunity to look 
in through formal and informal means of steady supply of key resources81. 
The overarching principles of China-Africa relations as highlighted in the White Paper are 
“sincerity, equality and mutual benefit82. These principles serve as a means of bolstering 
China’s activism in redefining South-South cooperation.  
Many argue that the efforts outlined in China’s Africa policy demonstrates a long-range 
influence, for it shows Africans and other peoples, a new kind of relationship that emphasises 
the goal of “developing together”83. 
 It is within these three key objectives of Beijing’s foreign policy that China-South Africa 
relations can be situated.  The PRC embarked on a rigorous campaign in order to influence 
South Africa to establish diplomatic ties with mainland China after 1994. In fact this 
campaign started way before 1994 and included numerous goodwill visits as well as outright 
coercion. But in 2009, the relationship can be said to be noteworthy and highly sophisticated.  
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China’s former Ambassador to South Africa, Liu Guijin stated, that as a result of concerted 
efforts from both sides, the two countries have exemplified the true meaning of “strategic 
partnership”84. 
Overall, China’s post Cold-War foreign policy, including the country’s African policy is 
largely viewed as one characterised by pragmatism. The pragmatic posture has come from 
awareness among Chinese leaders who came to realise that China is increasingly becoming a 
part of a larger international environment that provides opportunities for, as well as 
constraints on, its policy options85. This pragmatism is most pronounced in China’s 
engagements with African countries. The main driver of Sino-Africa relations is the 
economic dynamic, particularly China’s quest to source natural resources, particularly oil. 
The pragmatism can be found in the mutually beneficial means of engagement between 
China and Africa. China offers African countries much needed infrastructure, technological 
support, foreign direct investment among other things, and in return it has access to an 
abundance of natural resources and vast untapped African markets. Indeed, Africa has every 
reason to believe that China will prove to be a reliable and beneficial trading partner and that 
the economic relation will continue to intensify86. 
3.4.2 The Taiwan Factor. 
The enmity between Taiwan and the PRC is currently undergoing a significant shift. On 6 
November, 2008, Taipei welcomed the first high ranking official from Mainland China in 
over half a century. Chen Yunlin was in Taiwan to sign a trade agreement with Taiwan that 
many believe will greatly ease tensions between the rivals87. Chen was due to meet 
Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou. 
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This visit generated a great deal of interest, and indeed, controversy. The Chinese envoy was 
met with a hostile reception, with about 800 demonstrators swarming around the Grand 
Formosa Regent Taipei hotel88, where Mr. Chen was accommodated. Very few Taiwanese 
saw the visit in a positive light, the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) dogged 
Mr Chen’s footsteps with protests, accusing President Ma of selling out to the Chinese89. The 
Taiwanese perceive the easing of relations between the two countries as a threat to Taiwan’s 
independence. Central to the controversy around the historic visit was the question of how 
Mr. Chen will address President Ma. The Chinese communist leadership does not formally 
recognise Taiwan’s government, with Beijing insisting that Taiwan is a province of China, 
and Chinese provinces do not have presidents90. And so it was, that, Mr. Chen could not bring 
himself to call Mr. Ma “President”91. 
The main issue behind the seemingly easing relations is business. Negotiators from Taipei 
and Beijing took major steps toward closer financial cooperation and joint tackling of the 
international global financial crises92. Most eye-catching of the agreements is a big expansion 
of direct transport links; a new direct air route avoiding Hong-Kong airspace will reduce 
travel time from Taiwan to Beijing by one hour and save an estimated 40-50% in fuel costs93. 
The latest agreements offer more substantial business ties than ever before. It can be argued 
that the PRC has once again demonstrated pragmatism, by focusing on pragmatic 
engagement, and placing in the back seat the controversial political issues. These 
developments will have to be closely monitored; it would be worth noting how the easing of 
tensions manifest in how the two countries’ international interaction. 
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3.5 South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy. 
The ‘moral’ internationalism of South Africa’s post-Apartheid foreign policy was most 
evident in Nelson Mandela’s article entitled “South Africa’s Future Foreign Policy” which 
appeared in the December 1993 edition of Foreign Affairs. The article essentially summed up 
South Africa’s envisaged foreign policy in the incumbent ANC administration as one that 
would be underpinned by the respect of human rights. Mandela was conscious of the urgent 
need for South Africa to‘re-engage’ with the rest of the world following nearly forty years of 
international isolation94. He mentioned the new pillars of South Africa’s foreign policy; these 
pillars placed South Africa in a position of moral high ground when it comes to issues 
concerning human rights violations, following the country’s experience with apartheid. 
Indeed, Mandela’s declaration on the eve of the 1994 elections that “human rights will be the 
light that guides our foreign policy” 95, set the tone for the contours and conduct of the 
country’s future foreign policy. 
However, following this moral and highly idealistic stance, the new government, in practice, 
found itself in a number of foreign policy predicaments. One such that has been described as 
a debacle is the conflict between East Timor and Indonesia. The Mandela presidency found 
itself torn between East Timorese resistance movements, with whom they identified with and 
the government of Indonesia. South Africa abstained on resolutions criticising the Indonesian 
Government’s human-rights violation at the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1997 and 
199896. This became the pattern, with South Africa failing to condemn human rights 
violations in Malaysia, China and Taiwan, due to financial contributions made to the ANC by 
these governments.  
The second instance of ambiguity in the country’s foreign policy was over the 1995 crisis in 
Nigeria, when the military junta of Sani Abacha executed several civil rights activists 
including the popular activist of the Ogoni, Ken Saro-Wiwa. This crisis must rank as one of 
the most serious and potentially explosive challenges to confront the new South African 
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government, testing the ANC’s foreign policy ideals97. The executions were condemned 
worldwide; South Africa was in a difficult position considering the ANC’s close ties with the 
Nigerian political elite and military establishment. When the government came under 
pressure to condemn the Nigerian government, its reputation had already suffered 
tremendously. South Africa was chastised from all corners of the continent, and the country’s 
‘African’ credentials were questioned. The new government had to learn the hard way about 
African realpolitik. 
It would appear that to date, interest not sentiment governs policy formulation in South 
Africa’s foreign affairs despite the rhetoric of a foreign policy rooted in the respect for human 
rights. A November 2008 article appearing in the online version of the Economist calls South 
Africa’s foreign policy “the see-no-evil foreign policy”98 and largely questions the departure 
from the immediate post-apartheid position that saw South Africa as a shining beacon of 
human rights.  
Over the years the country’s foreign policy has demonstrated a notable shift from the foreign 
policy mapped by Mandela in 1993. Others have attributed this shift to pragmatism, others 
call it realist tendencies. It is not always advisable to have a foreign policy based on 
subjective ideals, considering the turbulent and unpredictable nature of the international 
system.  Pragmatism, by definition, is behaviour disciplined by neither a set of values nor 
established principles99. It is therefore, tempting to advocate for a pragmatic foreign policy. 
One other important approach that can be used to analyse South Africa’s post-apartheid 
foreign policy is that of the personality in policy making. This is best illustrated by examining 
foreign policy under the administration of former President Thabo Mbeki. Leaders, and the 
kind of leadership they exert, shape the way foreign policies are made and the consequent 
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behaviour of nation-states in world politics100. Under the leadership of President Mbeki, 
South Africa followed what Naidu has called a neo-realist approach to international affairs101, 
this manifested in the country’s foreign policy. Under President Mbeki, foreign policy took 
on a more realist, if not pragmatic approach, which was at times highly criticised. Indeed, 
even during Mandela’s presidency, the influence of the personality was evident although it 
never flourished, as foreign policy was largely characterised by ambiguity. Evans summed up 
this phenomenon of the ‘hero-in-history’ by arguing that the tradition of personal diplomacy 
initiated by Jan Smuts still persists in South Africa, where the philosophical framework from 
which policy initiatives emerge remains intact102. 
3.5.1 South Africa’s post 1994 policy towards China. 
South Africa is China’s second biggest trading partner in Africa after Angola. In 2008 the 
two countries celebrated ten years of formal diplomatic relations. After 1994, relations 
between the two countries began a lengthy and intricate evolutionary process. Beijing had 
severed its ties with Pretoria in the 1970s, while Taipei maintained its relations. In 1994, the 
new government realised that it was faced with a dilemma; indeed, it was a difficult time for 
politicians and bureaucrats alike. The choice appeared clear; a choice between Taipei and 
Beijing, in practice the situation was far more complex. Whatever steps the new government 
was going to take would have serious implications for its own policy objectives and goals.  
The flow of official and non-official visitors increased beginning in 1992; these included a 
South African Communist Party (SACP) delegation and high-ranking PRC government 
officials103. The PRC adopted a much more vigorous two-pronged policy of consolidating 
existing ties and exploring new areas for co-operation, and simultaneously increasing 
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pressure on South Africa to upgrade their diplomatic ties with Beijing104. Pressure was 
increasingly applied on the new South African government to recognise the PRC over 
Taiwan, with which the former apartheid government had ties with. It was this pressure 
coupled with other dynamics that led to the establishment of formal diplomatic ties between 
the PRC and the new South African government. 
Since 1994, South Africa’s foreign policy-making has frustrated commentators who have 
complained about its incoherence and contradictory nature. What perturbs them most is 
Pretoria’s vacillation between ‘realist’ and ‘moral’ internationalism105. It can be argued that 
this was a tussle between the ANC’s own vision of the country’s foreign policy and the 
realities of a foreign policy required by a state of South Africa’s stature and size. The former 
can be found in what was envisaged to be the ten pillars of the country’s new foreign policy 
written by Nelson Mandela in 1993. The document paid much attention to the issue of human 
rights; that they extend beyond the political, embracing the economic, social and 
environmental106 spheres. This is the moral internationalism referred to above. The realist 
tendencies manifested in later events such as the Lesotho invasion in 1998. 
Due to the historical relations between the CPC, ANC and SACP, it was presumed that 
Beijing’s status would be almost automatically elevated in the new regime. But this was not 
going to be the case. Speculation on the imminent split in relations between Taiwan and 
South Africa ran particularly high since the PRC’s high profile Minister Qian Qichen, and 
Vice-Minister, Yang Fuchang paid a transit visit to Johannesburg in 1992107. South Africa 
was, however, determined to take its time and weigh its options before making a final 
decision. The decision was so complicated that Pretoria was even contemplating dual 
recognition. The new government was never in doubt about the potential benefits of aligning 
with China; the situation was made more difficult by Taiwan’s chequebook diplomacy, which 
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saw Taipei spending a lot of money on the ANC’s election campaign prior to the 1994 
elections108. 
That the newly democratic South Africa would extend relations with Beijing was never in 
doubt, what interested Pretoria’s new leadership and the foreign policy fraternity was how 
this relationship would be expressed in diplomatic terms. Despite numerous commercial 
carrots and the ideological affinity between the Chinese government and the ANC, Pretoria 
was to recognise the PRC as the official representative of the Chinese state four years into 
government109. The Mandela Presidency had a number of factors to consider, the Two Chinas 
dilemma forced the Presidency to realise that arriving at a decision was fraught with internal 
contradictions110. It became a matter of balancing the country’s own foreign policy goals with 
the principles of promoting human rights.  The Two Chinas dilemma was a true test of the 
new regime’s ambitious, albeit ambiguous foreign policy. 
A number of factors contributed to South Africa’s eventual switching of diplomatic ties. As 
mentioned earlier, China offered South Africa a much more tempting proposal, than did 
Taiwan. Notwithstanding China’s permanent membership at the United Nations Security 
Council, in the mid-1990s China’s economy was already sky rocketing ,and all indications 
were that China was well on its way to becoming a superpower of note. It is often argued, 
that the “Hong-Kong factor” played a major part in the recognition struggle. Beijing was 
determined to use the timing for the return of Hong-Kong as leverage.  
Beijing had made it clear that with effect from 1 July 1997, all states that did not have 
diplomatic relations with the PRC would have to close down their diplomatic missions and 
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other activities in Hong-Kong111. This would have been economically devastating to South 
Africa. At the time the island was South Africa’s fifth largest trading partner112.  
With all these political and economic considerations, it was eventually pragmatism that 
guided South Africa’s decision-making. 
South Africa’s new foreign policy was forced out of ambiguity, and ultimately proved to be 
more ‘realist’ than moralistic. In the ultimate analysis, Pretoria could not ignore the rise of 
China in the global system and the attendant benefits that establishing formal ties with 
Beijing would bring113. After reaching agreement on relevant issues, the two countries signed 
a Joint communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations in December 1997, where 
the South African government affirmed that it would adhere to the One-China policy114. And 
so it was that on the 1 January 1998, Pretoria formally switched its diplomatic ties from 
Taipei to Beijing. 
The 1st of January 2008 marked ten years of China-South Africa formal diplomatic relations. 
Since 1998, bilateral co-operation has flourished, and there has been a high flow of high-level 
visits. Indeed, the first decade of diplomatic relations between the two countries has proved to 
be highly successful. This is largely due to the many areas of convergence between the PRC 
and South Africa, from commitment to stronger South-South cooperation and an altered 
international system to political and economic interests on the continent. Naidu notes that 
Africa has become a new frontier for both Pretoria and Beijing politically and 
economically115.  
It can be argued that China views South Africa as its gateway to the continent. If other 
African countries saw South Africa engaged in a fruitful relationship with China, there would 
be no reason why they could not do the same. South Africa has considerable influence on the 
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continent and can be a trend setter in terms of Sino-Africa relations. However, the countries’ 
interests on the continent also have the potential to become a major area of contention. 
High level political visits have acted as an enabler for business ties to grow. Several South 
African business delegations led by the President or Vice-President have made their way to 
China in the past decade. These have proven to be fruitful, as at January 2008, bilateral trade 
stood at US $ 9.7 billion, with South Africa being China’s number two trading partner in 
Africa, after oil-rich Angola116. The countries have been active in international forums, with 
the political and trade departments of the two countries working closely together. China and 
South Africa have also been voting in concert in international forums such as the United 
Nations and World Trade Organisation. This cooperation is expected to increase, as Davies 
notes that a strategic partnership requires more than commercial exchange, that the next 
decade will be driven by strategic political co-operation between Pretoria and Beijing in 
Africa117. It is this cooperation that will determine whether the countries’ converging interests 
will be cordially managed or contested. 
3.6 Conclusion. 
The two countries’ cooperation at the UN and WTO should be viewed in light of the 
background presented above. This chapter has attempted to understand the newly emerging 
international order in the post-Cold War period. This period is important as there were 
significant domestic changes in several developing countries, including South Africa and 
China.  
The most important of these changes pertinent to this study was the evolving foreign policies 
of China and South Africa.  This enabled both countries to engage differently with the rest of 
the world, and for them to reconsider their domestic, regional and international roles. For 
China this was largely the ‘go out policy’, where China came out of a long period of looking 
inwards. For South Africa this came in the form of the demise of apartheid. 
China’s foreign policy has evolved into one of the most unique, yet ambitious of the 21st 
century. As ambitious as it is, the PRC’s foreign policy is not destructive in its path; Chinese 
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politicians have crafted a foreign policy that could be perceived as ‘benign’. So far this 
unique policy has worked for the PRC, and has enabled the PRC to engage more 
constructively with the rest of the world. South Africa, on the other hand experienced 
turbulence in the initial years following majority rule in 1994. The country was following a 
rather ambiguous foreign policy, with no clear direction; this led to several awkward 
incidents. Slowly the country has attempted to define itself within the regional, continental 
and global contexts, sometimes taking on an Africanist identity. However, this has also not 
been clearly defined and still exposes the country for lack of a coherent foreign policy. 
The nature of the two foreign policies will be demonstrated in their behaviour in the United 
Nations and World Trade Organisation. The examples used will also demonstrate the 
continuing evolution of China and South Africa’s foreign policies.  
It will be a long time before either country has a definite and constant foreign policy. At 
present both country’s foreign policies are dynamic and constantly under alteration. 
The following chapter looks at how these foreign policies and the new international context 
enabled China and South Africa to engage in international organisations. We begin with the 
United Nations. 
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Chapter 4 
 4. China and South Africa in the United Nations. 
4.1 China and the United Nations.   
China’s history in the United Nations (UN) has been tumultuous and characterised by the 
struggle between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC), 
now Taiwan, as the sole representative of the Chinese people. The ROC was one of the 
founding members of the UN in 1945 and occupied a permanent seat on the Security 
Council118. The situation changed dramatically with the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek’s 
Nationalists in 1948, and led to their subsequent retreat to Taiwan in 1949, and the 
establishment of the PRC in October 1949119. The struggle for legitimacy began almost 
immediately, with the new PRC regime questioning the legitimacy of the ROC as the 
representative of the Chinese people at the United Nations. 
Within the UN there was robust debate over Chinese representation. This was taking place in 
the midst of the Korean War, the war itself heightening tensions between China and the 
United Nations which directly influenced the Security Council’s rejection of a Soviet motion 
to accept the PRC and reject the ROC120. The following years saw several diplomatic 
machinations within the UN with attempts and counter attempts to extend or limit the PRC’s 
status within the organisation. The PRC had strong allies in the General Assembly, as well as 
in the Security Council. The Soviet Union was one such ally, when relations between the two 
communist countries were still cordial. But the ROC was still a member of the Security 
Council, and would not be swayed when it came to the PRC. China’s posture toward the 
United Nations during the pre entry period may be characterised as one of “love me or leave 
me, but don’t leave me alone” passing through stages of naive optimism, frustration, 
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disenchantment, rebellion, disinterest, revived hope, and a sophisticated diplomatic campaign 
to gain her seat121.  
The PRC was particularly nervous about the United States, the former argued, that it appears 
that the UN had become an adjunct of the US State Department122. As early as the 1960s, the 
PRC saw the power politics that were played out at the UN, largely at the expense of the 
“Third World”. What is also clear, however, is that the PRC has never been against the idea 
of the UN, let alone joining its ranks. 
The US persuaded the ROC to change its mind regarding China’s membership, reassuring the 
former that it would continue to retain its seat in the Security Council. What this in effect 
meant was that the only way the General Assembly could expel the ROC would be through 
obtaining a two- thirds vote123. From this point on, countries friendly to China, led by 
Albania, began tabling an annual resolution in the General Assembly to transfer China’s seat 
in the UN from the ROC to the PRC124. 
With these changes taking place in the UN, more significant changes were taking place 
outside the organisation. The late 1950s and 1960s saw the large scale decolonization of 
many Asian and African countries; and most of these countries were almost immediately 
joining the United Nations. It will be important here to remember the Afro-Asian solidarity 
that was emerging, of which the PRC was part of, this Afro-Asian solidarity was best 
illustrated by the 1955 Conference in Bandung. As a result of the changing international 
context, on 25 October 1971, the General Assembly finally passed the Albanian proposal by a 
vote of 76 to 3 with 17 abstentions; of the 76 countries that voted in favour, 26 were from 
Africa125. The resolution effectively withdrew recognition of the ROC and recognised the 
PRC as the sole representative of the Chinese people. This was the beginning of China’s 
internal restructuring as well as its ascent to international prominence. 
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On November 23, 1971, China at one and the same time became both a participant and a 
decision maker in the Security Council, from which she had been excluded for over two 
decades126. The world’s attention turned to the PRC, to see what kind of Security Council 
member it would be, taking into consideration some of the rhetoric that had characterised the 
PRCs foreign policy, most notably its support for the Third World. China had been presenting 
herself as a rallying point for Third World unity and emancipation. Many have noted that 
China’s identification with the Third World is also rooted in the country’s self-image, 
national aspirations, and world view127. At the time many believed that the rhetoric was 
merely that, rhetoric, and would not translate to any real action. A Soviet delegate at a 
General Assembly plenary session accused the PRC of using the ‘third world’ as a means to 
achieve its real aims, i.e. as a spring –board”128 for immediately becoming a superpower.  
Indeed, despite China’s arguments about unity within the Third world, there have been 
compelling factors hindering that unity. Lack of active involvement and participation in the 
Third World, as opposed to rhetorical support, is only one of these129. Indeed, as Kim notes, 
that upon the PRCs accession to the UNSC, it was interesting to watch and see which 
geographical-caucusing groups it would join, and that interestingly the PRC joined the Asian 
group, while declining to be a part of the Group of 77130.  
The Chinese refusal to take an active and leadership role in any of the General Assembly 
groupings is an interesting dynamic, one that has carried through to the present. However, 
things have slightly changed, with China closely associating with the G-77, though not yet a 
full member. This non-committal stance has often been viewed negatively by others, arguing 
that China is truly using the “Third World”, and is not really interested in its unity. However, 
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this non-committal behaviour has not been accompanied by any action to affirm it; instead 
the PRC continues its activist role for the developing world. 
In the 21st century in particular, China has been more decisive in its rhetoric and action 
regarding the reform of the international architecture and support of developing countries. 
This has seen China taking on tougher stances and using its veto power in favour of the 
South. At the 60th General Assembly Session on Security Council Reform in 2005, 
Ambassador Wang Guangya, China’s permanent representative to the UN, reiterated China’s 
position on Security Council reform. He argued that China supports the necessary and 
rational reform of the Council, including its expansion and the improvement of its working 
methods, in order to maintain its authority, increase its efficiency and strengthen its role131. 
The Ambassador further stressed the anomaly in the number of developing countries in the 
UN and their serious lack of representation in the SC132. 
Indeed, at the beginning of the 21st century, China has become a powerful player in world 
politics. This of course, is commensurate with the country’s economic stature which has 
allowed China to participate in world affairs with high conviction. A good indication is 
China’s involvement in UN peacekeeping, providing over 7, 500 military observers, 
engineers, medical teams and other specialists in support of UN peacekeeping missions133. 
Therefore, it can be said that the PRC is slowly starting to demonstrate tangible commitment 
to the South, although the level of rhetoric remains, it has been accompanied by significant 
achievements. It should be noted here, that action does not necessarily denote activity that 
will be approved of by all and sundry. As it will be demonstrated in the next few pages, and 
indeed in the next chapter, China has become more active in developing country activities 
and unity, and can sometimes be viewed as a de facto leader of the South. Some of the 
actions taken by the PRC have been condemned and criticised, they nonetheless fall under the 
category of South-South cooperation. 
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4.2 South Africa and the United Nations 
South Africa was one of the original 51 founding members of the UN, which came into 
existence on 24 October 1945134. During this period South Africa was still a Union following 
independence from Britain in 1910. At this time South Africa was viewed as an important or 
potentially important player in international affairs. South Africa had also been one of the 
founding members of the League of Nations, the predecessor to the UN, under the capable 
stewardship of Jan Smuts. Following the Nationalist Party victory and the formation of the 
Republic in 1948, and the subsequent institutionalisation of racist policies, South Africa 
remained a member of the UN. It was not until 12, November, 1974 that the UN General 
Assembly decided to suspend South Africa from participating in its work, due to international 
opposition to apartheid135.  
While alienating the apartheid regime from international affairs, financial and moral support 
was given by the UN to national liberation movements. Both the Pan Africanist Congress and 
the African National Congress obtained observer Missions at the UN with UN financial 
support136. 
Vigorous debate took place in the General Assembly regarding the correct action to take 
against apartheid South Africa. The UN, especially the General Assembly soon became a 
battleground for a controversy between the adamant opponents of apartheid, mainly in the 
Third World, and its lukewarm supporters in the West137. Eventually, the opponents’ views 
prevailed, resulting in more consensuses in favour of formal and strict sanctions against the 
regime. An elaborate Programme of Action against apartheid was produced and adopted by 
the General Assembly in 1983, containing admonitions to NGOs; political parties etc. to 
cease all collaborations with the apartheid regime138. Certainly, the UN can be said to have 
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played a role in the eventual, yet inevitable fall of the apartheid regime. One could also argue 
that the action was long delayed and came in the dying days of apartheid, when the imminent 
demise of the regime was already quite apparent.  
Most troubling is the fact that it took the UN almost two decades to recognise the violations 
against human rights so brazenly committed by the regime. This concern leads me to two of 
the most pressing challenges currently facing the UN, and it would appear, judging by the 
time it took the organisation to react to apartheid South Africa, these challenges are not new. 
The UN is notorious for delayed responses in crisis situations, particularly in Africa, this 
problem can be explained by the second challenge which is the inequality that characterises 
the organisation. These interrelated challenges have led to the immense suffering of innocent 
people, and in turn bringing the organisation’s credibility to question.  
Decision making is primarily made by the rich countries of the North, who in most cases are 
not bothered by “Third World” mayhem; so long as it does not affect them. Had there been 
more equality and transparency in the UN, where countries of the South have a voice in 
decision making, we could have seen decisive action taken much earlier against the apartheid 
regime in South Africa. 
South Africa’s own transition more or less coincided with major shifts and changes in the 
global order. The most egregious of these was the disintegration of the Soviet empire and the 
unprecedented impact of globalisation on the world economy139. The landmark 1994 election 
paved the way for the complete normalisation of South Africa’s relations with the UN140. 
South Africa has since its re-admittance actively participated in the United Nations, and 
indeed, on certain occasions played a major role (some controversial). As mentioned earlier 
in Chapter 3, the new governments’ foreign policy has undergone an evolution, and has been 
under a lot of pressure. The government has been accused of taking decisions contrary to the 
tenets that supposedly to underpin the country’s foreign policy. Examples will also be 
provided later in this chapter, of South Africa’s stances at the UN. Nonetheless, the country’s 
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global status has increased significantly through participation in the various UN bodies, 
agencies and General Assembly Sessions141. 
Though not a member of the Security Council, South Africa has been an important player in 
that forum. For the first time in its history, South Africa received the non-permanent seat on 
the Security Council for the period 2007-2008. As a result of this the country became one of 
the strong voices of the South. South Africa has been vocal on the need for equitable 
representation for UN members, and the overall restructuring of the UN system.  
Having chaired UNCTAD, NAM, the G-77 plus China, as well as the Commonwealth, attests 
to the trust afforded to South Africa by the international world, but most importantly, by the 
rest of the developing world.  South Africa is also one of the African frontrunners for a 
permanent seat on the SC. If South Africa and other developing powers succeed in joining 
this once undemocratic post-World War 2 club, they will be well placed to engage in this 
mammoth task of redefining the organisation142.  
South Africa is in a good position to influence decisions, though it may not be able to make 
them; hence the need to join with other developing countries, in an effort to consolidate a 
South agenda. Indeed, it seems a logical step for South Africa to form tactical alliances with 
like-minded countries, which stand ready to lead a debate on restructuring and enlarging the 
UNSC143. This is precisely what the functional theory addresses, the coming together of 
countries to achieve specific goals and objectives and to respond to a set of conditions. 
Motivated by the reality of inequality in the current global order, South Africa has formed 
close ties with countries of the South, including China. This is also testament to the other key 
aspect of functionalism, that cooperation among states or multilateralism has more rewards 
than unilateral action. South Africa, China, Brazil, India, Argentina and other leading 
developing countries have been consistent in their practical efforts to promote South-South 
cooperation. 
                                                            
141 Loc cit. 
142 Landsberg, C. “Towards a Development Foreign Policy? Challenges for South Africa’s Diplomacy in the 
Second Decade of Liberation”, in Social Research, Vol.3, No.72, 2005, p.744. 
143 le Pere, G. and Van Nieuwkerk, A.  Op. Cit. p.204. 
58 
 
South Africa’s multilateral diplomacy can therefore, also be contextualised within the 
concept of middle-income powers. The classification of middle-powers as a separate class of 
countries in the hierarchy of nations stands or falls not on their subjective identification but 
on the fact that this category of actors engage in some objectively distinct form of activity144. 
Historically, the middle power has tended to be in the middle rank of capabilities, but also 
stands in the middle of situations of conflict145.  
The middle-power theory, however, fails to adequately distinguish between established 
middle-powers and emerging middle-powers. However, South Africa can be termed a middle 
power in terms of both its position in a hierarchy of power and influence in world affairs146. 
South Africa’s involvement and leadership in multilateral institutions as well as its 
commitment to the reform of international institutions, attests to the country’s middle-power 
status. 
4.3 The Non-Aligned Movement as a platform for the South in the United Nations 
“The Non-Aligned met and passed resolutions; we refused to be pushed around in the United 
Nations” Julius Nyerere147. 
The relevance of the NAM has been questioned in the period following the end of the Cold 
War. The development of non-alignment happened against the backdrop of the Cold War148. 
Non-Aligned countries were asserting their individuality and independence from the two 
power blocs in world politics. Following the end of hostilities between the East and the West, 
the existence of the movement was questioned. The NAM has in fact, proved to be still 
relevant, if not more relevant in the current international epoch. At the end of the Cold War 
countries of the South have been facing a new set of realities, with the new configuration of 
global power, where there is an apparent systematic exclusion of the South. Indeed, with the 
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East-West dichotomy removed from the international arena, it has become conceivable that 
the North-South debate will dominate the agenda of international relations149.  
This is currently the state of international relations, where the major debates about the 
configuration of the international system are taking place between the North and the South. 
Non-Alignment is often wrongly perceived as an organisation of passive countries, who are 
withdrawn from international activity; this could not be further from the truth. During the 
Cold War, non-alignment may have meant a refusal by countries of the South to be drawn 
into the superpower ideological war and arms race. Today, non-aligned countries are very 
proactive. The new international order that gained prominence at the end of the War was 
particularly hostile to countries of the South; this meant a renewed effort to organised non-
aligned sates, to face the new challenges. Non-Aligned states have the advantage of numbers, 
and therefore form the majority in the UN. The NAM has reinvented itself, and is in a 
position to push for institutional reform in international fora, especially the UN. The biggest 
challenge, however, is that the NAM is not well-represented in the all powerful Security 
Council. 
Non-Aligned states now numerically dominate the international system. This is a reality that 
can be strategically used to the advantage of the Movement. Most developing countries are 
relatively weak and insecure as individual states, with the exception of a few emerging or 
established middle powers. This vulnerability has encouraged more developing countries to 
join the ranks of the NAM. With their numbers their only real strength, it was not long before 
the non-aligned countries formed their own ‘power bloc’ in world politics150. Nowhere has 
the existence of this ‘power bloc’ been more evident than in the UN. The UN has been used 
by non-aligned countries to act collectively, and to use their combined strength to advance 
their concerns.  
It appears that the future of the NAM lies in its origins; the development and security of 
developing countries. Revisiting Jawaharlal Nehru’s conceptualisation of non-alignment, as 
the pursuit of equality in world affairs through pooling the diplomatic resources of Third 
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World states in international forums151, would be a good starting point. It is evident, that the 
NAM has a big role to play in the contemporary discourse on South-South cooperation. 
The NAM is not only beginning to be vocal in the UN; NAM's efforts to bring about a New 
International Economic Order (NIEO) based on the ideology of development during the 
1970s were especially exerted in the UN152. The NAM together with the Group of 77 have 
always managed to keep Third World issues on the agenda in most UN forums and agencies 
through their numerical strength. It was the same NAM that in unprecedented fashion 
eventually transferred the ROC’s permanent seat in the UN Security Council to the PRC in 
1971. Prior to this, the UNSC did not have a single voice concerned with issues of developing 
countries, the inclusion of China, brought much needed hope. 
4.3.1 The post-Cold War International Context and the Non-Aligned Movement. 
During this period there has been a robust debate over the viability of non-alignment as a 
foreign policy orientation. The post-Cold War period has been portrayed as cosmopolitan, 
unipolar, multipolar or globalised. Pretorius notes that rather than posing challenges to the 
relevance of NAM, these interpretations can also be seen to justify NAM’s continued 
existence153. The newly emerging global context in the early 1990s presented the countries of 
the world with new challenges and opportunities; countries found themselves confronted with 
a rapidly globalising world. The Cold War’s end inaugurated a new and different ontology of 
international relations with globalisation as its driving leitmotif and essential structural 
underpinning154. Globalisation has therefore been the context in which development debates 
have taken place155, it is also within this background that North-South and South-South 
relations are debated. It is within this framework that the NAM has been revisited and revived 
to suit current circumstances.  
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4.4 South Africa and the Non-Aligned Movement. 
During apartheid, South African liberation movements were welcomed into the ranks of 
NAM and participated as observers in its activities. The African National Congress (ANC) in 
particular, has had close ties to the Movement since the latter’s inauguration. The NAM was 
formerly constituted in Belgrade in 1961, the same year the ANC was forced into exile. The 
1961 Belgrade meeting was one of the first international meetings the ANC attended as an 
exiled movement156. From then on, the ANC attended all NAM Summits. In all these 
meetings, the ANC was asking the non-aligned states to support it in the isolation of 
apartheid South Africa, and it received widespread support from members on this issue157. 
This was the beginning of the South-South solidarity that had begun at the Bandung 
Conference in 1955. 
It was no surprise that following the 1994 transition in South Africa, the new government 
under the leadership of the ANC was warmly welcomed into the ranks of the NAM as an 
official member country. A definition of the NAM by the South African Department of 
Foreign Affairs indicates a far bigger role of the NAM than mere non-alignment during the 
Cold War, “the Movement since its inception in 1961 has played a highly visible and crucial 
role in representing the interests of developing countries particularly in the eradication of 
colonialism, supporting struggles for liberation and self-determination, the pursuit of world 
peace and the search for a more equitable and just global order”158. This is an all 
encompassing definition, one that reflects the expansive role that the NAM has come to play 
in the foreign orientation of many countries of the South. At the NAM’s Ministerial Meeting 
in Cairo in 1994, South Africa officially joined the Movement, soon after the country 
assumed the Chair of the Movement and hosted the NAM Summit of Heads of State or 
Government in Durban, in 1998159. 
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South Africa’s assumption of the NAM Chair was significant as well as symbolic. It was 
significant because it coincided with the coming into power of President Thabo Mbeki, a man 
who has been hailed as the architect of South Africa’s foreign policy since the early 1990s; he 
was also the main force behind the ANC’s foreign policy in exile. The chairing was symbolic 
because it was in part a celebration of South Africa’s independence from apartheid rule, after 
a long and arduous journey of the struggle for liberation. And many of the Non-Aligned 
member states had witnessed the devastation caused by apartheid throughout the years. Also, 
several NAM member states hosted several ANC and other liberation movement exiled 
leaders and members. 
Dr. Garth le Pere notes that, indeed, it was Thabo Mbeki’s personal and intellectual interest in 
international politics that contributed to the country’s success in international forums160. 
During the next four historically eventful years, South Africa sought, as Chair to adhere to 
and advance the principles first enunciated at the 1955 Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung161. 
During South Africa’s incumbency, the NAM was revitalised, with several critical issues 
addressed and crucial relations established. The NAM became highly engaged in the 
Palestinian question, it tackled the challenges to multilateralism and the role of the UN. The 
methodology and organisation of the NAM and the need for the revitalisation of the 
Movement were also addressed. Of note, during this time a new relationship was established 
with inter alia the Group of 8 rich industrialised countries as well as with the European 
Union162. 
4.5 China and the Non-Aligned Movement. 
China’s close association with the “Third World” has meant close alliances with 
organisations representing the South. China was also well represented at the 1955 Afro-Asian 
Conference in Bandung. However, China’s non-aligned credentials have been questioned. 
Others argued that both China and the Soviet Union were closer in outlook to the non-aligned 
states, while others believed that China was closer to the developed nations because of its 
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population and potential national power163. To make matters worse, China’s “developing 
country” credentials became more questionable when it resisted for a long time formal 
membership of Third World organisations.  
China is not a member of the two major Third World organisations, the politically motivated 
Non-Aligned Movement and the economically oriented G-77164. It is only recently that China 
has assumed a formal observer status in the G-77, but still not as an official member country. 
China may have her reasons for refusing commitment to formal Third World organisations. 
However, the country has largely paved path for vigorous “Third World” development. China 
still portrays solidarity with developing countries, or still has a Third World consciousness165, 
regardless of the high levels of economic development that have taken place in that country. 
Indeed, as Ambassador Guijin noted, that China is still a low-income, developing country, 
with a per capita DGP of just over $ 1 000, trailing behind the 100th in the world166. 
What continues to inform China’s Third Worldism, despite its unprecedented growth and 
development, is also the striking contrast with Western approaches to the developing 
world167. China’s relationship with developing countries has also affected intra-NAM 
relations. India, another aspiring great power, may just be inspired to re-engage with 
NAM168. While China is often seen as an entity separate from the rest of the developing 
South169, the country keeps aligning itself with the developing world, and this is usually 
accompanied by practical solidarity. 
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But China’s relationship with NAM is not devoid of problems. Growing competition with 
other developing countries for markets and for available international recognition does not 
always augur well for closer China-developing country ties170. With China’s breathtaking 
growth and development levels and increasing international status, it is going to be 
increasingly difficult for Beijing to claim developing country status. Developing countries are 
starting to become uncomfortable in the presence of China as areas of convergence between 
the two are rapidly diminishing. However, I argue, that this can be overcome.  
Developing countries need more powerful members in their fold; this has proven to be the 
case in international trade negotiations, for example. Also, at the moment this discomfort is a 
result of perceptions about China, China has not done anything that blatantly betrays its 
developing world- aligned position. China continues to champion issues of the South, and 
votes as such in the UN and in other forums, and continues with its positive foreign policy in 
other developing countries such as those in Africa. China’s approach and engagement with 
other developing, particularly African countries remains better off than relations with the 
Western powers. China’s developing country engagement may be for its own selfish national 
interests, but what has been the determining factor are the terms of engagement, and the 
positive approach taken. 
4.6 Examples of cooperation in the United Nations (Security Council). 
Southern cooperation, or to be more specific, cooperation between China and South Africa at 
the UN has largely centred on issues of reform and South-South solidarity. However, the 
cooperation that has drawn the most attention is on specific UN resolutions regarding certain 
countries. This cooperation took place at a critical time for both countries. It coincided with 
China’s increasing activist role in the UN and the country’s overall strategy of portraying a 
certain image as an international actor of note. The cooperation also took place in the context 
of South Africa’s assumption of a non-permanent seat in the Security Council for the period 
2007-2008. On 31 December 2008, South Africa bid farewell to the position it had occupied 
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for two years. The South African Department of Foreign Affairs issued a statement noting 
South Africa’s tenure as an ‘historic success’171. 
China is a permanent member of the Security Council, and therefore has considerable power, 
and can overturn other members’ votes through the veto. China’s vote in most of the 
instances to be discussed below carried more weight than South Africa’s vote. It is not easy 
to pass judgement on the voting patterns; however, a particular trend is notable. It is a 
combination of pragmatism and self interest. This also applies to South Africa. South Africa 
went in to occupy the non-permanent seat with ambitions of eventually occupying a 
permanent seat; South African also had to take into consideration its role in Southern Africa, 
Africa and the world at large. Therefore both countries’ voting patterns and stances taken in 
the Security Council were guided by wide ranging logics. 
4.6.1 Zimbabwe 
South Africa is known for its attitude towards the Zimbabwe regime under President Robert 
Mugabe, the highly controversial policy of ‘quiet diplomacy’. South Africa has consistently 
taken a soft approach towards Zimbabwe, opting for a non-confrontational approach. Many 
have argued that this approach has proved highly ineffective, as the situation has continued to 
spiral out of control in Zimbabwe. Many placed the responsibility on South Africa to improve 
the situation in that country based on the geographic proximity, South Africa’s regional 
power status and because of the historic ties between the ANC government and the ruling 
party, the Zimbabwe African National Union- Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). South Africa has 
consistently called for dialogue between the main stakeholders in the Zimbabwean political 
crisis; this resulted in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) mandating 
South Africa under former president Thabo Mbeki to lead mediation efforts. 
China on the other hand, has not had much responsibility regarding Zimbabwe. However, 
rumours have persisted over the alleged supply of arms by Beijing to Harare. China is one of 
the few countries that have not issued sanctions or travel bans on President Mugabe and some 
of his close cartel.  President Mugabe is on record fully committing to the policy of ‘looking 
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east’172. He has publicly commented that his government looks East where the sun rises and 
not West where it sets173. This rhetoric came in the midst of worldwide condemnation of 
Mugabe and his government. Overall, Zimbabwe has enjoyed cordial relations with the PRC, 
also based on historic ties with the latter’s support of the liberation struggle. The political and 
economic situation, has however, deteriorated out of control in Zimbabwe, and calls have 
been made for different forms of interventionist measures. 
On 11 July 2008, a draft resolution calling for sanctions on Zimbabwe, including a travel ban 
and assets freeze on President Mugabe and twelve other individuals, was not accepted by the 
Security Council. The draft resolution came following the US and Britain’s proposal to 
impose tougher sanctions on President Mugabe and his closest allies. This rejection was 
largely seen as a historic diplomatic defeat for the West in the Security Council174. 
The proposal for new sanctions came after the debacle that was the 27 June runoff election in 
Zimbabwe. The election was initially intended to be a runoff between President Mugabe’s 
ZANU-PF and the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC); however MDC 
leader Morgan Tsvangirai withdrew days before175, Mugabe decided to go on with the 
election, with him essentially being the only candidate contesting the election. And as would 
be expected, Mugabe emerged the victor and inaugurated himself within one day after the 
electoral results came out. Following this parody of the electoral process, many felt that 
Mugabe had gone too far, and needed to be stopped as a matter of urgency.  
The United Kingdom (UK) and the US forced the draft resolution to a vote because they 
counted on the support of nine members needed to secure adoption. In a dramatic show of 
hands, the draft did indeed earn the requisite nine votes to pass, with five against, but was in 
the end not adopted because of Russia and China’s block176. In addition to China and 
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Russia’s vetoing of the text, South Africa, Libya and Vietnam also voted against the 
resolution177. The US and the UK found the veto incomprehensible, and both began attacking 
Russia for its decision.  
UK Foreign Secretary, David Milliband and US Ambassador to the UN, Zalmay Khalilzad 
questioned Russia’s reliability as a G-8 partner178.In its defence, Russia argued, that it was 
casting its veto to prevent the council under the influence of Western members from 
meddling in the internal affairs of a UN member state179. Both China and Russia stressed that 
they did not want to meddle with the dialogue taking place between the Zimbabwean 
government and the opposition.  
Ambassadors Wang Guangya and Vitaly Churkin of China and Russia, respectively, argued 
that Zimbabwe does not pose an international security threat180. South Africa’s Ambassador 
to the UN Dumisani Kumalo noted that his delegation had vetoed against the draft resolution 
because of South Africa’s membership in the AU and   SADC181. Indeed, this draft resolution 
came after the conclusion of an African Union (AU) Summit in Egypt, where the AU had 
failed to take a hard position towards Zimbabwe. South Africa was therefore not in a position 
to act outside the decisions taken by the AU and SADC. 
Regardless of the reasons presented by the parties involved, the eventual blocking of the 
proposal for tougher sanctions against Zimbabwe was a show of leverage by developing 
countries. The decision was particularly humiliating for the West. South-South cooperation 
takes different forms, and some of the decisions will not be popular, but as mentioned earlier 
different logics guide countries’ decisions at the Security Council. 
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4.6.2 Burma/ Myanmar 
China has been accused of defending the military junta in Burma. The junta came into power 
in 1962, and has been in power since. Burma’s political history is that of repression, brutality 
and the stifling of pro-democracy forces in that country. The history of repression is 
epitomised by the 1988 uprisings. After major democracy uprisings and subsequent 
massacres in 1988, elections were held in 1990 for a national legislature, won in a landslide 
by Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy182.  
But the ruling generals refused to turn over power to the elected representatives and many of 
them and their supporters were jailed or placed under house arrest183. Over the years there has 
been a constant struggle in Burma between the junta and those brave enough to publicly 
voice their dissatisfaction with the status quo. The response of the junta to such public 
demonstrations has been nothing short of absolute brutality. 
The story of Burma has captured the world’s attention. In many capitals and cites of the 
world, there have been protests and campaigns in support of the oppressed people of Burma. 
Indeed, the support has been warranted considering the socio-economic conditions and the 
humanitarian crises in that country. Burma is the poorest country in Southeast Asia after East 
Timor184, in terms of gross domestic product. The dire socio-economic situation has been 
worsening over the years, hence the increase in public protests. It is because of public 
protests and the junta’s response that have put Burma high on the agenda of the UN in recent 
times. 
In September 2007, violence broke out in the capital, Rangoon, amidst renewed public 
protests. This was followed by the ruling military junta intensifying its crackdown on 
dissidents185. The protests had begun in August to address the issue of economic hardship, 
and had gained momentum with more people involved. Indeed, the protests had taken the 
form of a wider movement, led by a determined alliance of Buddhist monks, calling for an 
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overthrow of the junta186. The worst of this round of protests came when troops in Rangoon 
opened fire on unarmed monks and their supporters making it the bloodiest day of the 
protests. 
The attacks on the monks captured the attention of the UN Security Council, among others. 
The Security Council held an emergency session to consider a joint call for sanctions from 
the US and the EU187. However, Russia and China blocked any suggestion of global sanctions 
against the Burmese regime. The two countries had attempted to prevent the emergency 
meeting but failed. With Russia and China blocking global sanctions, George Bush 
announced new sanctions and European ministers said they would consider toughening the 
existing package of EU sanctions188. It was not only China and Russia who felt there was no 
need for sanctions on Burma. Previously, when a UN Security Council resolution was put 
forward demanding the junta to stop human rights abuses, South Africa had voted against the 
resolution, joining China and Russia. 
South Africa’s decision was criticised, particularly at home. The opposition Democratic 
Alliance (DA) questioned South Africa’s first significant vote since taking up its non-
permanent seat on the UN Security Council189. The DA raised questions about the worrying 
continuation of South Africa’s “quiet approach” to dictatorships and their human rights 
abuses190. Many lamented South Africa’s foreign policy, as having reneged from its founding 
principles of 1994 marking the importance and the respect of human rights. China’s decisions 
were equally reproached, however, plausible reasons for the latter’s decisions were 
speculated. China is Burma’s biggest economic partner and supplier of defence equipment; in 
addition, Burmese oil and gas are vital for China’s economy191. Burma is also a vital market 
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for goods from China’s Yunnan province192. Therefore it made no economic sense for China 
to impose global sanctions on Burma. 
China and Russia argued that their decision is in fact what is best for Burma. They made it 
clear that they would resist any deeper UN involvement on the grounds that it would interfere 
with the internal affairs of a sovereign country193. China’s representative to the UN, Wang 
Guangya, argued that China acknowledges that there are some problems in Burma, but that 
these problems at the moment do not constitute a threat to international and regional peace 
and security194. Even South Africa’s Dumisani Kumalo was at pains to point out that indeed, 
there is concern about the situation in Burma, but South Africa does not feel that a strongly 
worded resolution was the appropriate way of engaging with the government of that 
country195. 
4.6.3 Sudan 
The war in the Sudan, between north and south had been one of the longest running conflicts 
in Africa. Since independence, Sudan has been embroiled in a bloody civil war, with 
intermittent periods of relative peace. It has not been easy to manage the conflict, partly 
because of the sheer size of the territory. Sudan is roughly the size of Western Europe196, 
making it the largest state in Africa, by land mass. More recently, stability has been made 
more elusive by the eruption of conflict in the western region of Darfur. The conflict in 
Darfur has been a major source of contention in African diplomatic circles, as well as 
internationally. There are divergent views on how best to approach Sudan’s intra-state 
conflicts. Most African countries with the leadership of the AU have rejected any suggestions 
of drastic measures towards the Khartoum government, rather opting for diplomatic 
engagement.  
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Internationally, particularly the West, the only way to deal with Khartoum is believed to be 
drastic measures. However, countries like China and Russia have been cautious and have 
preferred diplomacy in engaging with Khartoum.  With the signing of the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA) on 9 January 2005 between the North and the South, ending the 21 
year war, and the subsequent establishment of the Government of South Sudan, there is 
currently a fragile peace in Sudan, while the Darfur conflict persists.  
The CPA has facilitated an important change in its formerly fixed axis of engagement with 
the central government in Khartoum197. 
China’s relations with Sudan warrant special attention. Sudan is an exceptionally complex 
case, and presents an example where China’s undertakings in Africa are being thoroughly 
tested. There is no doubt about the centrality of oil to the evolution of relations between 
China and Sudan. China essentially developed Sudan’s oil sector from nothing to an oil 
exporting country. Within four years, following China’s initial investment of over $3 billion 
and the building of the entire Sudanese oil industry infrastructure under the lead of Chinese 
engineers Sudan became an oil exporter198. The relations have expanded and evolved, 
spanning a number of different sectors. Sudan has become one of China’s strongest trading 
partners in Africa; indeed, Sudan was the third largest trading partner with China in Africa in 
2004 and 2005, after South Africa and Angola199. I mentioned earlier that China-Sudan 
relations warrant special mention, mainly because Sudan is more than a trading partner with 
the PRC, but a very large investment.  
The government of the PRC has had the misfortune of occupying centre stage in discussions 
about the conflict in Sudan. With good reason, one might add, because the position of other 
external actors in Sudan does not come close to that of China. However, at times, the 
continued focus on Beijing has diverted attention from the central role of sitting government 
in Khartoum in the conflict, and to a lesser extent, the political circumstances contributing to 
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the conflict200. Indeed, it would be imprudent to reduce Darfur to oil and natural resources. 
China has not played an extensive role in Darfur, to date201.  
However, one thing is certain, and that is Beijing’s concern over the situation in Sudan. This 
concern is reflected in China’s votes in the Security Council, and has led to what Large calls 
‘China’s evolving diplomacy’202 regarding Sudan. 
During the course of 2006 and 2007 there was a noted shift in China’s attitude towards 
Sudan. Previously, Beijing’s support for Khartoum involved a combination of protection and 
political help. In the most astonishing move, when after three long harrowing years of 
negotiations characterised in part by Beijing’s defence of the regime in Khartoum, China 
voted along with the Security Council in favour of a decisive resolution that empowers troops 
to defend civilians203, as well as authorising a UN- AU hybrid mission to Darfur (UNAMID). 
Beijing’s previous intransigence was based on one of its key foreign policy principles, the 
doctrine of non-interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states, which had largely 
underpinned its relations with Africa. The passing of resolution 1769, with China’s vote in 
favour, was widely welcomed, and prompted unusually positive headlines204. South Africa’s 
voting in favour of the resolution was in line with the position of the AU. 
A second important UN Security Council resolution regarding Sudan that I wish to discuss in 
connection with resolution 1769 is that on Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir’s 
indictment by the International Criminal Court (ICC). In July 2008, the ICC led by its chief 
prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo indicted President Bashir for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity in the conflict in Darfur, and asked the court’s judges to issue a warrant for his 
arrest. The matter appeared before the UN Security Council. Africa was unambiguously 
opposed to this motion, led by South Africa and Libya; they attempted to have the Council 
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prevent the ICC from indicting President Bashir for genocide205. South Africa was largely 
criticised for offering its support to President Bashir. However, South Africa’s position 
stemmed from that of the AU, which expressed concern over the timing and appropriateness 
of the ICC’s actions, considering internal dialogue taking place in Sudan. China also argued, 
that indicting Bashir would undermine peace efforts in Darfur and that it supports suspending 
the indictment206. Others who opposed the indictment include the Arab League. 
The two votes mentioned above taken by both China and South Africa are significant as well 
as related. They are related because UN resolution 1769 displayed an effort to bolster the 
presence in the ‘international community’ in Darfur and was a show of commitment by 
external actors to the ending of that conflict. On the one hand, the indictment of President 
Bashir by the ICC almost served to reverse resolution 1769. China’s voting in favour of 
resolution 1769 reflects two things: first, it reflects Beijing’s concern over its reputation and 
image in the international context207; second, it shows that Beijing is prepared to recondition 
its policy of non-interference in order to secure its investments and interests in Africa208.  
Resolution 1769 was a colossal step in China’s Africa policy, and was said to have sent alarm 
bells across capitals in Africa. However, it is unlikely that this will dent China’s image on the 
continent, considering the deep level of relations already established and the realisation by 
African leaders of the potential benefits from Sino-Africa relations. South Africa’s voting on 
the other hand reflects that the country’s positions are to a large extent influenced by those of 
continental and regional bodies, particularly the AU. It took former President Mbeki a while 
before making a public announcement on the indictment, and this was because the AU was 
still formulating its own position, which most African countries were expected to acquiesce 
to. 
Many agree that Beijing has been engaging with Khartoum regarding Darfur, even prior to 
the passing of resolution 1769. Large states, that China’s willingness to engage in Darfur 
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predated the much publicised US-led campaign over the ‘Genocide Olympics’ that gathered 
momentum in 2007209. In an interview with Sanusha Naidu, she noted, that China’s taking of 
a subtle interventionist stance was because of Beijing’s frustration with Khartoum210, 
following a period of diplomatic engagement. Paula Roque, also noted, that China has been 
engaging with Sudan, however, on its own terms211. China did not wish to be dictated to on 
how to engage with Sudan, hence the intransigence on decisions relating to Sudan, and the 
resistance to calls of sanctions from the West. Roque and Naidu concur that the ICC’s 
indictment of President Bashir threw China completely off track. Naidu further notes that 
China had made headway with Bashir, and that the ICC’s indictment threatened to undo this 
progress. This would explain Beijing’s calls against the ICC’s indictment. 
Beijing is never coerced into making any decisions by external actors. China is one of the few 
countries, and South Africa to a certain extent that is not necessarily phased by widespread 
international condemnation of their Security Council decisions. This was more evident in the 
two years 2007-2008 of South Africa’s non-permanent membership in the Security Council. 
This is evident from the examples furnished in this chapter, most of which were widely 
unpopular. The debate is currently on, on the success or failure of South Africa’s tenure as an 
elected member of the council. South Africa is the first to admit success, as Foreign Affairs 
Minister noted in a statement she made shortly after the expiry of the term, in early January 
2009, she noted that “South Africa’s central strategic objective was to help advance the 
African agenda, but also actively engage on all issues on the Security Council agenda...South 
Africa also influenced a large number and diversity of Council outcomes”212.  
The unwavering resolve demonstrated by both China and South Africa in the midst of 
worldwide condemnation can be attributed to their middle-power or semi-peripheral status. 
These are countries that are after international prominence, China has good reason to believe 
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that it is well on its way to becoming a superpower. South Africa is a regional and continental 
power and seeks more prominence internationally, prominence which could ultimately lead to 
a permanent seat on the Security Council. Indeed, to be a super power, a country makes 
difficult if not unpopular decisions, and most importantly is not coerced or harassed by the 
more powerful. It can therefore be argued that, this is what China and South Africa have 
demonstrated, according to the cases presented above and others that have been left out. 
4.7 Conclusion. 
This chapter has looked at the background and performance of China and South Africa within 
the UN system. The context was set by looking at the Non-Aligned Movement, the largest 
political organisation of countries of the South. The relevance of NAM was also examined 
mainly because of its history, and its relevance was found to be even more pertinent today 
than it was during the Cold War.  Examples of cooperation were analysed. There is a clear 
pattern of South-South cooperation, as the two countries were voting for South solidarity, but 
also in defiance of the North.   
China has the advantage of being a permanent member of the UNSC. This coupled with the 
PRC’s insistence on its developing country status, developing countries have enjoyed a level 
of protection on the SC. Zimbabwe, Burma and Sudan, have all enjoyed China’s protection. 
South Africa also had the fortune of being elected to become a non-permanent member of the 
SC, and used this position to advance its foreign policy objectives. Both SA and China’s 
performance in the SC has sparked controversy. However, it must be appreciated that both 
countries have demonstrated a high level of South solidarity while on the SC. This solidity 
becomes problematic when judged in subjective terms, because many argue that South Africa 
throughout its tenure as a non-permanent member has in fact taken a principled stand in its 
voting patterns.   
It would be misleading to argue that the cooperation demonstrated by South Africa and 
China, in the examples presented above was wholly motivated by South-South cooperation. It 
is evident that this cooperation is influenced by an array of factors, of which South-South 
cooperation is only a part of, there are also regional and continental considerations, 
particularly in the case of South Africa, and there is also the prime consideration of national 
interest.  
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Chapter 5 
 5. China and South Africa in the World Trade Organisation. 
5.1 China in the World Trade Organisation. 
China’s accession to the WTO has to be contextualised in the PRC’s discourse on economic 
reform, as well as the nature of the current global economy. On 17 September 2001, the 
WTO successfully concluded negotiations on China’s terms of membership of the WTO213. 
The text of the agreement was adopted formally at the WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, 
Qatar in November 2001214. The negotiations for China’s entry into the WTO took almost 
fifteen years. With the negotiations finally concluded, China agreed to undertake a series of 
important commitments to open and liberalise its regime in order to better integrate in the 
world economy215. China officially became a member of the WTO on 11 December 2001. 
It appears that it was almost two decades ago that China became aware of the changing global 
economy, and applied for WTO membership. The international background for China’s 
accession to the WTO is economic globalisation216. The need to join the WTO was a sign of 
Beijing’s readiness to adopt free-market oriented economic policies and to be integrated into 
the global economy. Long Yongtu, who at the time of the negotiations was the Chinese Vice-
Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic cooperation, notes that there are advantages as well 
as drawbacks in joining the WTO, but to join is the unavoidable choice217. In order for China 
to actively take part in global and regional economic cooperation, it has to adapt to the 
international economic environment brought about by economic globalisation. 
China is one of the 23 original signatories of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) in 1948; however, after China’s revolution in 1949, the government of Taiwan 
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announced that China would leave the GATT system218. In 1986, China notified the GATT of 
its wish to resume its status as a GATT contracting party. China’s accession process to the 
WTO was guided by a Working Party whose membership consists of all interested WTO 
member governments219. It can be argued that the eventual conclusion of negotiations after 
fifteen years was given impetus by China’s overwhelming position in the global economy 
and in world trade. In 2000, China was the 7th leading exporter and 8th largest importer of 
merchandise trade220, and fast approaching the position of world’s second biggest economy. 
There are four strategic considerations for China’s entry into the WTO. These are articulated 
by Long Yongtu, who in 2001 was the Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade and 
Economic cooperation. These considerations are in line with China’s post-Cold War foreign 
policy, which aimed to position China at the focal point of international affairs:  
I. To take part in the process of economic globalisation. Here the Chinese look back to 
the father of Chinese economic reform, Deng Xiaoping’s proposal to engage in the 
market economy as an important preparation for China to take part in economic 
globalisation. 
II. To make the promise of observing WTO rules and opening up the market is 
conducive to creating a favourable international image for China and a favourable 
international vision in which to develop the economy. With China’s speedy growth, 
the Chinese government has had to deal with the issue of how to eradicate the idea of  
China being a threat to other countries. To observe the WTO rules will help to 
minimise the perception of China as a threat, rather to let other countries see Chinese 
development as a major opportunity for them. 
III. To enter the WTO and promise to observe and open up the market is an important 
condition for domestic economic restricting. China hopes to conduct industrial 
restructuring on a world basis, rather than be restricted to the domestic market. China 
also wishes to develop its service trades such as telecommunications by opening to 
the outside world. 
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IV. Finally, China believes that entering the WTO is conducive to strengthening the 
country’s international status. The Chinese strongly believe that when the UN restored 
to China its lawful seat in 1971, it symbolised China’s return to the international 
political arena. The fact that China was not a member of the WTO, which can be 
compared to a United Nations in economic matters, was incomparable with China’s 
international status221. 
With the current Doha Development Round on the verge of collapse, China has been among 
the countries of the South that have created the impasse. Also, with the global financial 
meltdown that we saw towards the end of 2008, there is increasing pressure to wrap up the 
round. Chinese Ambassador to the WTO, Sun Zhenyu argues that WTO members have to be 
realistic, and should try to have a balanced outcome. The Ambassador also urged developed 
countries to keep in mind the development mandate of the Doha round, and not to seek their 
own comfort without considering major concerns of developing countries222.The impasse is 
likely to continue, especially in light of the financial crisis, where developed countries could 
revert to strong stances and more protectionist tendencies, and abandon the so-called 
development agenda of Doha. 
Although China largely collaborates with the Southern bloc at WTO trade negotiations, the 
PRC has not taken any strong or leadership positions, yet. Dr. le Pere notes that since joining 
the WTO China has been circumspect in taking a lead for developing countries, as opposed to 
its more decisive role in the UN223. Therefore we cannot talk of China leading the South in 
WTO trade negotiations. The circumspection can be attributed to China’s recent accession to 
the world body.  There is no doubt that China is comfortable and familiar with its position in 
the UN, however, China is yet to conclude the first decade of its WTO membership. It can be 
argued, that the PRC is still trying to find ways in which it can best have an impact in the 
WTO, by incorporating strategies for its own national interests as well as advancing the 
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South agenda. It should be noted that taking leadership and being active are two different 
things.  
On the accession of China to the WTO, Payne notes that the country’s role in the negotiation 
of the new round in 2001 could not be predicted, but after Doha, China’s role would 
definitely matter224. China has been active in the WTO by working within the ambit of the 
Group of 77, which will be discussed later in this chapter.  It is therefore worthy to note, that 
China openly backed the Like Minded Group (LMG) of developing countries at the 2003 
Cancun Ministerial in Mexico225. 
5.2 South Africa in the World Trade Organisation. 
South Africa was a member of the GATT and had participated in the Uruguay Round of trade 
negotiations which was concluded on 15 December, 1993226. South Africa also ratified the 
Marrakesh Agreement in December 1994 and thus became a founding member of the WTO 
when the organisation was established on 1 January 1995227. Therefore, South Africa has a 
relatively long history in the GATT/WTO system. 
The policy stances of the apartheid era governments towards trade issues were unabashedly 
protectionist228. This was driven by the government’s need to provide welfare for the white 
(mainly Afrikaner) minority population. The result was substantial growth in the local 
manufacturing industry. South Africa’s limited domestic market dictated that local 
production of most capital and many intermediate goods employed in domestic production 
across all sectors of the economy was uneconomic229. In the 1970s, the government started to 
pay some attention to exports; this coincided with the growing recognition by the government 
of the limitations of inward looking industrialisation strategies for narrow needs. 
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After 1994, the new government faced significant challenges, particularly in selecting an 
(international) trade policy. Two fundamental issues of a strategic nature faced the new 
government. According to Blumenfeld, the first of these was where the South African 
government should focus its trade policy in a new globalising and post-sanctions 
environment, the choice being between the African hinterland and its global trading 
partners230. The second issue concerned South Africa’s stance towards global trade, how it 
should relate to the GATT/WTO and the associated North-South cleavages in trade 
politics231. Indeed, the government was faced with difficult and crucial decisions to make, as 
each decision would carry significant implications for the country’s reintegration into the 
world economy. It was not until 2000, that the Department of Trade and Industry produced a 
Global Economic Strategy which sought to integrate the three distinct terrains of strategy 
formulation: multilateral, regional and bilateral, within a common framework. 
The new government took an immediate interest and sometimes unexpected commitment to 
the WTO. The first step taken towards rebuilding the country’s global trade relations was an 
offer of a substantial, but phased reform of South Africa’s tariff schedule. The offer, made to 
the GATT Uruguay round, was remarkable for the apparent depth of the proposed reforms; 
that it was made in advance of the conclusion of the political negotiations over South Africa’s 
future was all the more remarkable232. It would appear that in spite of the outcome of the 
political negotiations, there was consensus on the future economic direction of the country. 
Initially, post-apartheid South Africa’s attitude to the WTO was largely self-interested: the 
primary concern was to use the multilateral rules system to promote pro-competitive 
domestic reforms. By the late 1990s, however, this concern had been replaced by an evident 
ambition to play a more substantial role in multilateral trade negotiations themselves233.  
Realising its potential power in trade negotiations, and the imbalances that exist in 
international trade, South Africa sought to offer leadership and support to other developing 
countries, particularly African countries. South Africa was encouraged from various sections 
                                                            
230 Blumenfeld, J., Op. Cit., p.434. 
231 Loc cit. 
232 Blumenfeld, J. “South Africa’s evolving foreign trade strategy: Coherence or Confusion? In Buhlungu, S. 
et.al (eds.) South Africa 2005-2006 State of the Nation, HSRC Press, Cape Town, 2006, p.435. 
233 Blumenfeld, J., Op. Cit., p. 438. 
81 
 
of society on this issue, particularly from academia. South Africa was encouraged to use 
interactive strategies, by combining forces with other middle powers; for example, that the 
combined forces of Brazil, South Africa and China are well placed to shift the global focus 
onto the needs of developing nations234.  
South Africa has since been active in WTO negotiations, and has become one of the strong 
advocates for reforming the WTO system in an effort to be more representative and just. 
South Africa’s rhetoric for reform in the WTO has, however, not always translated to 
practice. Patrick Bond argues that Pretoria’s reformist tendencies and frustrations with the 
international system should be viewed in the context of the political power associated with 
the late 20th century economic crisis and the ideology of ‘neoliberalism’235. South Africa has 
also lacked consistency in its rhetoric on reform at trade negotiations. On several occasions, 
South Africa has looked after its own interests at the expense of African and other developing 
countries.  
Following the debacle that was the Seattle Ministerial in 1999; many developing countries 
were against the launch of a new round of negotiations without addressing the issues that had 
caused Seattle to fail. However, on arrival in Doha, Qatar, in November 2001, delegates 
learned that the chairman of the conference had appointed, without consultation, six ‘friends 
of the chair’ to act as facilitators for each of the key negotiating areas. All of these six 
‘friends of the chair’ came from countries known to be sympathetic to the launch of a new 
round, namely: Singapore, Switzerland, Chile, Canada, Mexico and South Africa236. The 
issues that had caused Seattle to fail were largely those relating to developing countries, and 
it was the African bloc that had made sure Seattle fails, and a new round is not formed.  
Alec Erwin who at the time was South African Minister of Trade and Industry disappointed 
observers by accepting the controversial ‘friends of the chair’ position237. 
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South Africa began alienating African negotiators and civil society activists with some of the 
positions Erwin took at WTO meetings. As the November 2001 Doha agenda emerged, social 
movement critics united with the more ambitious African delegations, Erwin viewed their 
arguments with disdain238. These and other incidents where South Africa was seen to be 
cosying up with WTO leaders and the leading capitalist countries of the North, made other 
African countries uneasy. It was during this period, that talks of sub imperial South Africa 
began to surface. South Africa’s going alone at WTO did not augur well for the continents' 
unified bargaining position, in fact it compromised it. In the end, critics and the African voice 
were defeated, and Erwin prevailed. It appears that at times South Africa feels that being part 
of a unified African stance at trade negotiations may compromise the country’s own interests. 
This does not augur well for advancing South-South cooperation, and most importantly for 
reforming the system. As the Executive Director of the South centre so eloquently puts it, that 
“sometimes the South manages to sing in harmony, but when the ‘big ones’ among them are 
cajoled into the ‘Green Room’ process of the WTO, the harmony breaks down into a 
cacophony”239. 
5.3 The Group of 77 as a platform for the South in the World Trade Organisation. 
As previously mentioned in Chapter 3 of this paper, the G77 is another important 
constellation of developing countries which is economic oriented. It was formed to advance a 
common platform in the United Nations and its Economic and Social Council which 
specifically addressed issues of trade and development240. The Group of 77 (G-77) was 
established on 15 June 1964 by seventy-seven developing country signatories of the “Joint 
Declaration”241.  The main aim of the G-77 is to provide a platform for countries of the South 
to articulate and promote their economic interests and their joint negotiating capacity on all 
major international economic issues and promote South-South cooperation for 
development242. The original name of the G-77 was retained for its historical significance, 
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even though the number of member countries has increased significantly, and now includes 
China, though not as an official member country. Indeed, the formation of the G-77 was 
historical, as one of major platforms for developing countries at the time; it also emerged 
shortly after the establishment of the NAM in 1961.  
Sharing his reflections on the formation of the G-77, Julius Nyerere noted that the problem of 
colonisation was perceived politically by the leaders of the nationalist movements, and that 
not all of them realised that they were also economically colonised243.  
This is an important point Nyerere was making because many countries, throughout the Third 
World only realised after independence the serious economic challenges they faced. The 
problem of economic liberation got lost in the political struggle and that is precisely what the 
colonialists wanted244. 
 Fanon also lambasted nationalist leaders, arguing that nationalist leaders mobilise people for 
independence, and for the rest leave it to future events, and that when asked about economic 
programmes they are incapable of replying245. This partly explains the continued pillaging of 
natural resources by foreign agents under different guises after independence. Fanon further 
argues that the nationalists who come into power have nothing more than an approximate 
bookish acquaintance with the actual and potential resources of their country’s soil and 
mineral deposits246. Indeed, in Africa since independence, political, rather than economic 
logics have prevailed. Economic challenges have been attempted to be resolved in political 
terms. Unfortunately, this has prevailed in Africa regardless of the G-77, hence the large 
disparities in economic development between Africa and its Asian counterparts. 
One of the biggest challenges facing the South is not only the asymmetrical power relations, 
but the diversity of the South as well. The South is of course, not as homogenous as say, the 
North. The latter has more cultural similarities than the South, and has similar economic 
interests. Europe speaks with one voice; the South with more than a hundred, what divides 
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them is their disparate national interests247. This, however, should not deter South-South 
cooperation, there is more to gain for the South in cooperating with each other. This is more 
important in time of crises, such as the current global financial crisis the world is 
experiencing. The global financial meltdown, which is worse than the 1929 crisis has 
afforded the opportunity to look afresh at institutions of global economic governance, 
including the WTO248. 
 
Currently, one of the most contentious issues within the WTO is the conclusion of the Doha 
Round of trade negotiations. The Doha round was launched in November, 2001 under very 
difficult conditions, and was dubbed a ‘pro development’ round, in an effort to appease 
developing countries that were against its launch. The Doha ‘development round’ as it is 
known was nicknamed that way to show that this round of trade negotiations were to favour 
poor countries ability to develop and prosper from global trade249. Whatever the specific and 
or rhetorical commitments made to developing countries, the fact remains they conceded the 
launch of a new round without prior correction of the imbalances of the Uruguay Round250. 
The round has been characterized by double talk and empty promises. In July 2008, in an 
effort by the developed nations to reach a deal on Doha, the talks collapsed.  
 
The talks largely reached an impasse due to the stance taken by developing countries not to 
falter under pressure. The talks reached a dead end after India and the US locked horns on the 
issue of protection to farmers in the developing countries251. It has largely been the resistance 
of developing countries, most of which belong to the G-77, that has delayed the talks. The 
Chinese Ambassador to the WTO cautioned that with the financial crisis, the situation is quite 
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different to that of July, and that to get what nobody got in July, there has to be a level of 
realism on some of the key issues holding back the talks252. 
 
5.3.1 China and the Group of 77. 
There is not much literature on China’s unofficial accession into the ranks of the G-77, which 
is today sometimes referred to as the G-77 plus China. However, it is noteworthy that this 
significant step coincided with China’s accession to the WTO in 2001. Upon joining these 
intergovernmental world bodies, China has become a force of note, albeit Beijing’s 
reluctance to formally join developing nation organisations. 
As noted earlier, the PRC is still undergoing economic reform; the journey is not yet over. 
China is straddling two economic systems, a version of communism and a version of market 
liberalisation. The WTO has become a highly significant global trade body, acting as a 
permanent forum for liberalization of trade in goods and services253. There is no doubt about 
the promotion of free market principles by the WTO. China’s accession has meant an 
inevitable move in this direction. It can thus be argued that China is not yet in a position to 
play a ‘leadership’ role in any capacity in WTO deliberations. Many have said that China is 
largely learning on the job, because the country is not yet accustomed to the rules of the 
game, the game of free market principles.  
On the other hand, it is possible to make an argument about Beijing’s ‘identity crisis’, of 
whether it belongs in the developing or developed world. As one of the largest economies in 
the world with high levels of growth, possessing the world’s largest foreign currency 
reserves, and so forth, it is very difficult to offer solidarity with poor developing countries, 
and for the developing countries to genuinely believe this solidarity. 
Beijing is finding it more difficult to convince the rest of the developing world that it still 
belongs in their ranks. Naturally, China’s needs in the WTO will be significantly different to 
those of say, a Benin, Montenegro or Thailand. This is why China has to strike a balance 
between practical South-South solidarity and its own national interests.  
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5.3.2 South Africa and the Group of 77. 
South Africa was the chair of the G-77 plus China in 2006. As the chair during the period of 
2005-2006, South Africa sought to use this position to further deepen the United Nations’ 
institutional reform agenda and to promote economic reform programmes within the UN 
system254. During South Africa’s tenure as Chair, the plight of developing countries became 
more apparent, with glaring inequities in the international system. Also, the South was 
becoming more marginalised from the international system, existing far from where decisions 
are made. It was these considerations that informed South Africa’s diplomacy as chief 
advocate for the G-77 plus China during its chairmanship255. 
An important point made by Patrick Bond, and as suggested in the title of his book “Talk left, 
Walk right”, is that Pretoria has been confused about its identity and where its loyalties 
should lie. Indeed, this is a feature shared with China. As demonstrated earlier, Pretoria has 
no qualms joining the rich countries of the North in the controversial “Green Room” at WTO 
negotiations. Pretoria has on several occasions compromised the ‘African bloc’ in the WTO. 
However, Pretoria is also quite comfortable with Charing one of the largest organisations of 
countries of the South. This is a clear indication that the country is struggling to come to grips 
with its international identity. Bond argues that Pretoria’s global and continental reforms 
have been systematically frustrated, partly by design and partly through forces beyond 
Mbeki’s control256. Indeed, inside the country, dissatisfaction with Pretoria’s local and global 
initiatives began to grow. It was becoming evident that there is a clear disjuncture between 
the country’s rhetoric as Chair of the NAM, the G-77 plus China, and other developing 
country initiatives and actual practice.  
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5.4 Examples of South-South Cooperation in the WTO process. 
Payne argues that the precise terms and conditions by which international trade is conducted 
cannot but be a major bone of contention in relations between states257. This is precisely the 
case when these relations are between the rich countries of the North, and their poorer 
counterparts from the South. Many experts and scholars are in agreement that the inadequate 
legitimacy rules and lack of rational deliberation in the WTO yields power politics, coerced 
decision making and unjust outcomes258. 
In the following section I will present three distinct instances of South-South cooperation 
within the broader WTO system. The first two are instances of cooperation that have had a 
direct impact in the WTO process. The first is the impasse that led to the breakdown of the 
1999 Ministerial meeting in Seattle; the second instance is the formation of the Group of 20 
developing countries at the 2003 Cancun meeting in Mexico. The third instance is the historic 
2000 G-77 South Summit held in Havana, Cuba. 
5.4.1 The impasse at the 1999 Seattle Ministerial. 
Seattle was a watershed for developing countries within the WTO process. Seattle was meant 
to launch a new round of trade negotiations, but this was not to be. Going to Seattle, there 
was a myriad of issues that were left unresolved from the previously concluded Uruguay 
round. Most of these related to some of the agreements reached to conclude the round, and 
their implications for developing countries. Therefore, by the opening of the Seattle meeting, 
these issues were not only well understood, and the source of much anger, but also the basis 
for a series of quite specific proposals for redress259. One of the key groups to emerge here, 
and that became a prime actor, was the Like Minded Group (LMG). Its membership had 
expanded to include the Dominican Republic, Honduras and Zimbabwe, and overall 
represented a cross-section of regions (Africa, the Caribbean, Central America, South Asia 
and Southeast Asia)260. 
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Seattle did not portend well for the recently established WTO. The ill-treatment and 
deliberate marginalisation of developing country delegates served as a wakeup call for 
countries of the South. At Seattle, democracy, environment, labour conditions, indigenous 
people’s rights and other social struggles were not taken seriously by trade negotiators; most 
disturbing , Third World delegates were alienated from the high –level ‘Green Room’ 
discussions261 . Indeed, this was rather uncommon, as the launch of a new round is usually 
the least controversial stage of trade negotiations. However, exceptions do exist, most notably 
the Seattle Ministerial which was scuttled in part when several developing-country delegates 
were not invited to meetings of direct interest to them262. 
For developing countries, negotiations take place in the context of significant structural 
challenges in place, which result in asymmetrical deliberative capacities to the detriment of 
the South. Developing countries have themselves tried to strengthen their deliberative 
positions; by all accounts Seattle and Doha showed a more active Southern participation than 
ever before263. 
The LMG was meeting on a weekly basis and dividing up tasks, leading to Seattle264. The 
LMG was drafting proposals that would allow countries to deviate from their commitments in 
order to meet ‘development’ and food security needs265. The LMG remained firm in its 
hostility to the proposed negotiation of the ‘Singapore issues’ until the imbalances of the 
Uruguay Round had been corrected. Indeed, the LMG was the main force driving developing 
country issues at the Seattle Meeting, as well as a firm opponent to the launch of a new 
round. To that extent, the LMG resisted the whole notion of a new round being launched at 
Seattle. In other words, by the time the Ministerial Meeting opened in November 1999, it was 
obvious there were vast gaps between the positions of the main contending parties and 
coalitions266.  
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It was clear that the EU and the US underestimated the LMG and other smaller formations of 
African, Asian and Caribbean states. Few expected success at Seattle, yet notably even fewer 
envisaged the spectacular nature of the failure that unfolded267. The meeting was 
characterised by disarray both inside and outside the conference hall. The streets of Seattle 
were littered with protesters from assorted civil society groups, and were being chased and 
tear gassed by the police. Although this did not have any direct effect on the proceedings 
inside the conference hall, it gave the media and other observers more interest to what was 
actually taking place inside. Lack of transparency, among other things, led to a failed 
meeting. The LMG formally issued very strong statements indicating that, if the same level of 
transparency persisted, they would withhold their approval from any proposed declaration, 
thus torpedoing any common statement268.  It can also be argued that it was at this meeting 
that the ‘African bloc’ began to assert itself. Africa’s determination to do away with lack of 
transparency was instrumental to the impasse created at Seattle269 . 
Indeed, a number of factors contributed to the ultimate collapse of Seattle. However, it was 
the combination of the WTO’s coming to Seattle with a ministerial draft that reflected so 
many differences, the deep rift between the EU and the US on key issues, and the mutinous 
mood of developing country delegates270. It can be argued that developing countries were 
demonstrating solidarity with the impasse at Seattle. It started at Seattle in 1999; and now the 
dubious beginnings of the Doha round are currently manifested in developing countries’ 
refusal to wrap up the round. Developing countries are once again demonstrating solidarity, 
by refusing to wrap up a round that has not yielded any of the proposed ‘developmental’ 
pledges.  
However, Seattle will always remain where it all started; where developing countries began 
to strategically stand together as a geopolitical bloc. 
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5.4.2 The significance of the emergence of the Group of 20 developing countries at the 
2003 Cancun Ministerial. 
Following the dramatic failure of the Seattle Ministerial in 1999, and the subsequent launch 
of the Doha Round in 2001, there has been a proliferation of South coalitions in the WTO. 
The Doha round promised to be a ‘development’ round, one concerned with issues of 
developing countries. Alas, this promise has not been realised. As the Fifth Ministerial 
approached in September 2003, there had been no progress regarding the developmental 
mandate of the Doha round. Developing countries were once again feeling cheated, and thus 
Cancun presented a platform to assert themselves and to show their dissatisfaction.  
Cancun was determined by four areas of dispute: agriculture, position of cotton, strategic 
products and special safeguard mechanisms271. Of all these, agriculture appeared to be the 
key to the success or failure of the meeting. The EU and the US were particularly tough on 
agriculture, and agriculture is one of the most important economic activities in developing 
countries. The EU and US jointly tabled a proposed text on agricultural trade a month before 
Cancun. The two sought, essentially to consolidate their historically protectionist stances on 
agriculture by offering only limited concessions to agricultural exporters elsewhere272. This 
was a reversal of the promises made in Doha, and this was in clear contrast to the rhetoric of 
a ‘developmental round’ that was to be pro-poor in its approach. 
What is of significance and importance to this study is the response of developing countries. 
Brazil, India and China drafted an alternative text that was then signed by another 18 
countries, most from Latin America, but also including South Africa. Although there had 
been an explicit intention to form a new negotiating group, the signatories eventually came to 
be known as the Group of 20273. The draft of the G-20 took a positive line and called for a 
significant reduction in the domestic support for farmers provided by the big industrialised 
countries. The G-20 also made sure to take up some of the issues that were raised by what 
had become a disintegrated LMG. 
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Brazil and India drafted the first text together and then collaborated with other countries that 
were to later join the group. With China on board, the group became one that combined 
(arguably) all the emerging powers from the developing world274. This coalition was 
particularly important, as this was the first coalition of note in which China participated in 
since its accession to the WTO. Not only was China a participating member, but also a 
founding member of the G-20. One of the important features of the G-20 proposals was that 
the coalition went beyond being a blocking coalition, but one that set forth concrete 
proposals.  
Narlikar and Tussie call the G-20 agenda a proactive one275, as opposed to a blocking agenda. 
It appears that the G-20 stood out quite significantly from previous WTO developing country 
coalitions; and most observers have attributed the group’s success to its unique and 
innovative character. 
Admittedly, the initial strength of the G-20 lay in its structure. As far as the EU and the US 
were concerned , it would have been very difficult for them to ignore a coalition that 
constituted over two-thirds of the worlds’ population, comprised over 60 per cent of the 
world’s farmers, and was led by a powerful core of emerging powers such as Argentina, 
Brazil, India, China and South Africa276. However, the coming together of powerful countries 
was not new, it had been attempted before and such coalitions had failed when it came to the 
moment of truth. The success of the G-20 lay in the strategies in employed, the group had to 
be very strategic to avoid failure. The chances of failure were also quite high, as the group 
was quite diverse in its composition, from Least Developed Countries (LDCs) to emerging 
powers, there was bound to be conflict within, and this is what the group had to avoid. Also, 
of critical importance was to avoid a situation where the smaller countries are swayed with 
carrots and sticks by the EU and the US. This was common practice by the big powers, and 
has been the downfall of many a coalition of developing countries. 
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Narlikar and Tussie argue that one of the critical success strategies that assured intra-group 
cohesion of the G-20 was keeping the core together, the core being China, Brazil and India277.  
Had there been discontent among the “Big Three”, it is likely that the group’s cohesion would 
have faltered.  Another strategy that contributed both to intra-group cohesion but also the 
external legitimacy of the group was the research and careful analysis that underlay its 
proposal278. With such research, the group understood each member’s needs and recognised 
potential fault lines and guarded against them. This is an indication of the sophistication of 
the group, as well as commitment to strategic South-South cooperation.  
Although the talks failed, Cancun saw the first instance where developing countries 
successfully took a unified stance against the rich countries279.According to Payne, the 
emergence of the G-20 constituted an absolutely critical moment in global trade politics; its 
membership combined some of the largest and powerful states outside the OECD, namely 
Brazil, India, South Africa, and most notably China280. It can be argued, that the formation of 
the G-20 at Cancun has set an important precedent for developing countries at WTO trade 
negotiations. Not only did the coalition constitute a major weight in economic terms, but also 
presented some moral weight, which it exercised to its great credit, by emphasising that it 
represented the interests of over half of the world’s population281. But most importantly, the 
G-20 demonstrated that it is possible for developing countries to form formidable coalitions 
and to have credible leverage and not succumb to divisive tactics by the rich countries. 
Both China and South Africa participated prominently in the G-20 at this meeting. Naturally, 
both countries participated for different reasons in this coalition. But one reason that is clear 
for all to see appears to be South-South solidarity. However, we cannot be certain of the 
authenticity of this solidarity, as South Africa has for example demonstrated behaviour 
contrary to South-South solidarity.  It was at the Ministerial preceding Cancun, that  
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South Africa was lured into the ‘Green Room’ by some of the developed countries. It is such 
divisive tactics that the G-20 successfully overcame, hence the need to build from that 
experience. China on the other hand, was making a debut in WTO negotiations, and had no 
real history. So far, China has proved to be strong in its commitment to South solidarity at 
WTO negotiations, and has over the past few years been one of the drivers of the South 
agenda at WTO meetings. 
Declaration by the Group of 77 and China on the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference at 
Cancun, Mexico (See Appendix 1). 
 
5.4.3 The historic 2000 G-77 South Summit in Havana, Cuba. 
The 2000 South Summit held in Havana, Cuba was significant for Africa and South Africa in 
particular. Former President Thabo Mbeki was the current chair of the NAM, and former 
President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria was the current chair of the G-77. Africa was at the 
centre of South-South cooperation, chairing two of the largest organisations of the South. But 
this Summit was also important for the South as a whole; the G-77 was meeting for the first 
time at Summit level since its inception. Southern Heads of State or Government were to 
meet under the banner of the G-77. The 2000 South Summit saw representatives from 121 
countries, including 42 Heads of State or Government, 13 Vice-Presidents or Vice-Prime 
Ministers, 67 Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Royal Highnesses, Ministers or Ambassadors282. 
The Summit was testament to the changing context of the international system and the 
monumental challenges this presents to the developing countries of the South. 
The G-77 had set an agenda composed of four basic topics: globalisation and the world 
economy, North-South relations, knowledge and technology and South-South cooperation283. 
This agenda reflects some of the most pressing issues facing the South at the beginning of the 
21st century. To a large extent, these issues are interrelated; globalisation is arguably the 
greatest challenge facing the South. The effects of globalisation on developing countries also 
rest on North-South relations. Globalisation manifests through the continued marginalisation 
of the South from the world economy. Certainly, the South takes global economic inequality 
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very seriously. According to Martin Khor of the Third World Network, the Summit’s 
Declaration was a sign of the South’s collective awareness of the unjust realities of the world 
economy284. The South’s assertions at the Summit also reflect awareness that any changes in 
the status quo or as Algerian President and OAU Chair Abdelaziz Bouteflika put it “a 
democratisation of the global system”285, will require commitment from the North, hence the 
insistence on cordial North-South relations. 
With Africa chairing both the NAM and the G-77, African delegates were feeling empowered 
at the Summit and therefore quite vocal. They were particularly active in debates on the 
effects of globalisation. Ugandan First Vice-Prime Minister and former Mozambican 
President Joachim Chissano argued that the process of globalisation began with colonisation 
and slavery, President Obasanjo noted that in fact what exists in the Third World is the 
‘globalisation of poverty and underdevelopment’286. What became clear at the Summit was 
that neo-liberal globalisation proposed to the South a model of development that developing 
countries see not only as undesirable287, but also downright unacceptable.  
Therefore, the final Declaration of the Summit (see Appendix 2) unequivocally reaffirmed 
the need to strengthen South-South cooperation under the current international context. The 
Declaration clearly states that the modalities of production and consumption that predominate 
in the North are unsustainable and pose a danger to the rest of humanity. It can be said that 
the Final Declaration is an unambiguous and realistic document that calls for immediate 
action. The Declaration also looks at the main problems facing the South, and this includes 
among other things, the debt burden, economic sanctions, the widening technological gap 
between the North and the South. The action called for in the Declaration was articulated 
more specifically in the Havana Programme of Action, with specific tasks and targets to 
realise. 
Final Declaration of the South Summit in Havana, Cuba, April 2000. (See Appendix 2) 
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It is therefore evident that there has been robust cooperation among countries of the South in 
the WTO, under the G-77 or other Southern groupings. A good example of this cooperation is 
the dramatic collapse of the Seattle Ministerial as a result of developing countries who 
refused to be mistreated and undermined, particularly an incensed African bloc. The 
galvanising spirit afforded by the first ever South Summit in 2000 laid a concrete foundation 
for a stronger South agenda; this is reflected in the Final Declaration. There is no doubt that 
the momentum built in April in Havana carried through to Cancun in September 2003. The 
formation of the G-20 was significant and set a positive precedent for South coalitions in the 
perilous environment of WTO negotiations.  
However, through all this positivity, there lurks behind it all the spectre of inequality within 
the South itself. This has the potential to derail South-South cooperation. As has been 
demonstrated by some smaller countries, including South Africa who have succumbed to 
pressures from the rich industrialised North, in return for minor country-specific trade 
concessions, the varying sizes and power of developing countries make them vulnerable to 
divisive tactics.  
5.5 Conclusion. 
This chapter has looked at the background of China and South Africa in the WTO system. 
The Group of 77+ China, formerly the G-77 was used as an example of the largest platform 
for the South in WTO deliberations. The G-77 was established to deal with the economic 
concerns of developing countries. Both China and South Africa have played different roles 
within the organisation. Three examples of cooperation were given, where there was decisive 
Southern consensus in WTO negotiations, with China and South Africa in leading roles. 
From this chapter it appears that South Africa is in some instances more interested in 
Southern solidarity when it means a positive outlook for its national interests. South Africa 
has displayed erratic behaviour in the WTO, whereas China is edging on in circumspective 
fashion. 
In this chapter it also became evident that developing countries have a particularly difficult 
time in WTO negotiations. The system has always been unfavourable towards developing 
nations, mainly because of the condition of chronic underdevelopment.  However, at the 
dawn of the 21st century changes began to occur, with developing countries coming together 
as a formidable bloc in negotiations. This trend started tentatively, and has been gaining 
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momentum over the years, with notable results. The strengthening of the G-77 through more 
robust engagement as we saw in the 2000 South Summit, as well as the addition of China 
have bolstered the bargaining position of developing countries in the WTO. Developing 
countries have the numbers in their favour, and have used this to their advantage. 
International trade is one of the most important arenas of international engagement and is 
taken very seriously particularly by developing countries who see it as a means to 
development.  International trade is therefore an integral part of a country’s foreign policy. 
This has been evident in the behaviour of some countries including South Africa in WTO 
trade negotiations, where collective interest is sometimes sacrificed for the interests of the 
individual state. This behaviour is not uncommon in international trade negotiations, and it is 
this behaviour that often derails South-South cooperation. However, there is cause for 
optimism; this behaviour is slowly being replaced by a stronger South in negotiations, there is 
an emergent realisation that the structural inequality within the WTO can only be overcome 
through an unyielding South. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion and Recommendations. 
In concluding this research report, it is necessary to reflect on the main research question 
posed by this study. 
The study has revealed the extent and nature of cooperation between China and South Africa 
in international fora. There is substantial cooperation between these two countries and this 
cooperation is to a large extent possible because of China and South Africa’s middle-power 
status. However, this cooperation is fraught with contradictions and predicaments. In the UN 
the countries cooperate on political issues concerning them as individual sovereign states, the 
South and the world at large. In the WTO they cooperate on issues of international trade, 
concerning them as individual sovereign states and in some instances they cooperate as 
members of the Southern bloc. 
Overall, it is evident that South-South cooperation is not the main driving force behind China 
and South Africa’s cooperation in the UN and WTO, and that current cooperation is not 
enough to achieve the goals of South-South cooperation.  A myriad of motives exist for their 
cooperation, but the most salient motive is national interest and this is arguably the main 
determinant of all cooperation, present and in the immediate future. China’s main 
preoccupation is with its ‘peaceful rise’288, on its way to becoming a world superpower. 
South Africa on the other hand is concerned with its regional and continental hegemonic 
standing and the eventual attainment of a permanent Security Council seat. For both 
countries, these are two fundamental foreign policy objectives, and these have largely 
influenced their conduct in the UN and WTO. 
In this report it has emerged that the concept of South-South cooperation is still somewhat ill-
defined, and is subject to an array of interpretations. One of the main problems lies in the 
definition of South-South cooperation.  This has contributed to the slow progress in the 
establishment of a formulaic and constructive South agenda. In practice, South-South 
cooperation is fragmented, with no focal area. It is not clear what one means precisely when 
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speaking of South-South cooperation. This is exacerbated by the fragmentation of the South, 
as a geopolitical unit. The South comprises a diverse constellation of developing countries 
with different political and economic formations. This makes it difficult to coordinate 
practices and to prioritise certain activities.  
It is therefore fair to conclude that South-South cooperation is to a large extent still confined 
to the level of rhetoric, and in its current state of practice is confined to the realm of the 
international system and  international politics. What we see in the WTO is largely guided by 
political imperatives. That is why in WTO negotiations a middle-income developing country 
such as South Africa can be easily coaxed to the infamous ‘Green Room’. It should be noted, 
however, that the overall cooperation among countries of the South in both the UN and WTO 
has been impressive, particularly in the latter. In this study it was demonstrated that in WTO 
negotiations, for example, it is middle-income countries that are the anchors of South-South 
solidarity, this is best exemplified by the emergence of the G-20 at the Cancun Ministerial. 
China has been shown to play a central role in South-South cooperation. The PRC is known 
for its rhetoric on South-South cooperation; however, this rhetoric is accompanied by some 
practical action. The PRC has a long history of engagement with the developing world, and 
has used this history to gain the trust of developing countries in the current world order. The 
PRC has used this strategy to make its mark as a major player in international affairs. China’s 
foreign policy is still evolving, as Beijing perceives the main prize to be undisputed 
superpower status. At the UN and WTO, the PRC has on several occasions proven to be a 
loyal member of the South.  Its unwavering support of the NAM and G-77 is an indication of 
China’s commitment to changing global inequality.  
However, the PRC faces a number of challenges in its continued membership of the South; 
the main being the country’s disproportionate power to the rest of the developing countries. 
This is proving to be a potential area of contestation in the future.  
There is a major gap between the economic capabilities of the PRC and the rest of the 
developing world.  This economic strength has by default elevated the country’s global 
political standing.  Other developing countries are beginning to question China’s commitment 
to the South agenda, not because of the PRC’s actions, rather due to the factual data at their 
disposal. 
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However, it is in Africa that China has established a firm presence; and it is on this continent 
that China’s commitment to the South will be truly tested. African governments have opened 
up to the Asian giant mainly because of the latter’s promise not to interfere in their domestic 
affairs. This is a policy that has hitherto worked immensely well for China. That was until the 
Sudan case. Sudan is the one African country where China has the largest investments; it is 
also one of the most unstable countries on the continent.  
The conflict raging in the west of Sudan in the Darfur region has brought China to the centre 
of the crisis. Voting in favour of the passing of UN resolution 1769 mandating the 
establishment of an UN-AU hybrid peacekeeping mission to Darfur, China transgressed the 
policy of ‘non-interference’. This was an unprecedented move on Beijing’s part, and its 
impact has not yet been established. What has been established, however, is that Beijing will 
interfere where its core interests are at stake, such as oil and other investments, as in the case 
of Sudan. China’s actions have been attributed to the need to preserve its interests, as well as 
the need to preserve its reputation. This could be seen as yet another turn in the PRC’s 
evolving foreign policy; the PRC could be re-evaluating some of its policies, in anticipation 
for the time when the country will become an undisputed superpower.  
The report has shown South Africa as playing a key, yet sometimes ambiguous role in South-
South cooperation. As a regional and continental power, South Africa has thus become a 
player of note in international affairs. In the period after 1994, South Africa has been in a 
process of establishing a foreign policy that reflects the multiple identities and roles of the 
country. This has proved to be an arduous exercise; this is reflected in the ambiguous and 
sometimes questionable positions taken by the country in the UN and WTO. The country’s 
post-apartheid foreign policy architecture is yet to be consolidated.  South Africa has chosen 
to be one of the strongest advocates of stronger South-South cooperation, calling for a radical 
change of the international order.  
Despite the occasional ambiguity, South Africa’s international profile has thrived over the 
years. This favourable international profile has resulted in expectations. South Africa is in a 
difficult position; the country has its own national interests that have to be balanced with 
external expectations. This is demonstrated in the WTO negotiations, where South Africa has 
on several occasions abandoned the African agenda, to pursue its own.  
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On the other hand, in the UN, South Africa has actively taken a position of African and 
South-South solidarity. This was most notable during South Africa’s non-permanent 
membership in the UN Security Council from January 2007 to December 2008. 
From the conclusions reached here it is clear that there is room for the strengthening of 
South-South cooperation, particularly from two of its strongest advocates, China and South 
Africa. 
This report recommends a clear definition of South-South cooperation. This must be the main 
point of departure in getting to grips with the concept. There is a need for deeper 
understanding of the diffused nature of South-South cooperation. What has clouded some of 
these crucial issues is the rhetoric surrounding South-South cooperation.  The rhetoric has 
been parochial and has masked issues of concern. Bringing together the South on broad 
issues that occur at the macro level needs to be re-evaluated. There needs to be a breakdown 
of issues, and cooperation should occur on specifics. A good example of this is the IBSA 
forum which is focused on economic issues and for the moment does not concern itself much 
with political matters.  The streamlining of South-South cooperation should occur at the G-77 
and NAM levels.  
Following from the above recommendation, there should be an effort to prevent the 
monopolisation of the South agenda by certain countries. This is in line with the need for a 
clearly defined South plan of action. Available evidence suggests that, indeed, China and 
South Africa have largely benefitted on the current understanding of South- South 
cooperation. The rest of Asia and Africa are lagging behind the progress made by China and 
South Africa, respectively. There is a need to regulate a situation, which by all accounts has 
already started, where the rest of Asia or Africa open their markets for Chinese and South 
African corporates, while the latter keep their markets closed off.  
South Africa should by all means coordinate some of its South-South engagements with the 
rest of the continent. This can occur at both the regional and continental levels. At the 
regional level, South Africa should be in communication with SADC in relation to South- 
South initiatives, and start off with intra-regional cooperation. And, indeed, South-South 
cooperation need not be trans-continental.  
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At the continental level, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) should be 
the main vehicle driving continental cooperation, together with the Regional Economic 
Communities (RECs). The same applies to China, as opposed to being a threat to regional 
organisations such as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), China needs to 
boost such organisations, and be a conduit for stronger intra-regional cooperation. 
China and South Africa, as economic powers in their respective regions should also drive 
cooperation between SADC and ASEAN.  It is true, that RECs are the future of African 
development, but the same argument applies to other developing regions around the world. 
It is here that the potential for stronger South-South cooperation lies. It is crucial that the 
focus shifts from parochial bilateral agreements to more robust and all-inclusive cooperation. 
Focusing on the regional networks reduces the monopolisation of South-South cooperation 
by a handful of countries, and allows for more profound cooperation among countries of the 
South. This could eventually lead to South –South cooperation taking place at the level of 
civil society, and the establishment of a more issue driven South agenda. 
The above-mentioned recommendations are made with the view of speeding up the process 
of establishing stronger South-South cooperation. The ultimate goal is to develop countries of 
the South to acceptable levels of development and to put an end to the cycle of poverty, also 
to see changes in the configuration of the international system. South-South cooperation 
aspires to equality in the international order, and to see the North deposed of its de facto 
position as world leader.   
This study has also raised a number of issues that warrant further study. One of the most 
critical is the notion of the ‘expected’ behaviour and role of middle-income developing 
countries in international fora. There seems to be an unstated expectation from these 
countries by others within the developing world.  
What are the implications of this tacit expectation? The second issue that requires further 
study is the nature of South-South cooperation; particularly political cooperation as is often 
the case in the UN. The report mentions this because of the criticisms levelled against China 
and South Africa in what is perceived as their support for dictatorships. Should there be 
criteria by which to judge South-South cooperation? And by whose standards should it be 
judged? 
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Finally, from 2009 and beyond, there are a number of issues that could potentially change the 
way China and South African conduct their international affairs. In South Africa, political 
changes are imminent, with a new administration in place under President Zuma. This means 
leadership change within the ruling ANC. The three experts interviewed in this report, all 
expressed a concern about the expected incoming leadership in terms of their commitment to 
international relations. The new leadership is largely expected to be inward looking, as Roque 
notes that “things will definitely shift, the new government’s rhetoric is inward looking”289. 
This could have serious implications for South-South cooperation which has played a crucial 
role in the growth of many developing countries in recent times, including South Africa’s 
own.  
For the PRC, one of the trends that require monitoring is the country’s role in Africa. 
Following what has been viewed by many as reneging on its policy of non-interference in 
Sudan, future Sino-Africa relations warrant close observation. It has become evident that the 
PRC will interfere when billions worth of its investments are at stake, and that the PRC is 
concerned about its self-image. There is noteworthy consciousness regarding its self-image. 
Following the PRC’s continued engagements in Africa should provide an indication of the 
future foreign policy of the country. Due to its dynamism, it is not easy to predict the PRC’s 
foreign policy, particularly in the relatively unstable African environment.  
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GROUP OF 77 & CHINA 
G E N E V A 
22 August 2003 
Declaration by the Group of 77 and China 
on the 
Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference 
Cancun, Mexico, 10-14 September 2003 
2 
A call for a multilateral trading system which is responsive 
to the needs of developing countries 
1. We, members of the Group of 77 and China, reaffirm our commitment to the 
eradication of poverty worldwide as stipulated in the Millennium Declaration and the 
Millennium Development Goals. Acknowledging that trade is not an end in itself but a means 
to development, peace and security, we aspire to creating a multilateral trading system which 
is 
responsive to the needs of developing countries. 
2. We recognize the significant importance of an open, rules-based multilateral 
trading system as one of the essential means for the promotion of economic development, the 
eradication of poverty worldwide and the effective participation and integration of 
developing 
countries, particularly the least-developed countries (LDCs) and small, vulnerable economies, 
into the world economy. We strongly believe that such a multilateral trading system would 
play 
a crucial role in fostering human progress and fulfilling the development goals and 
aspirations 
of all nations, especially those of developing countries. 
3. Mindful that the Doha Work Programme adopted at the Fourth WTO Ministerial 
Conference placed the economic interests and development needs of developing countries at 
its 
centre, we express strong disappointment over the missed deadlines and the lack of progress 
in 
the negotiations within the WTO, especially on issues of direct interest and economic value 
to 
developing countries. 
4. We note with concern the contrast between the objectives laid out in the Doha 
Work Programme and the proposals by developed countries in key areas of interest to 
developing countries, which fail to take into account our interests and needs. 
5. We call for a renewed political commitment of all countries to address the 
inherent asymmetries and inequalities in the international market place, the structural 
limitations, inadequate supply capacities and the vulnerabilities of developing countries to the 
external economic and financial environment and the pressures that arise therein, and to put 
in 
place a development-oriented multilateral trading system, both in words and in action, in 
order 
to ensure that all countries, particularly developing countries, can share in the prosperity that 
globalization offers. 
6. We call on the participants of the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference to expedite 
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the Doha negotiations with an aim to the successful conclusion of the Doha Round. We 
strongly believe that a successful conclusion of the Doha negotiations that is 
developmentfriendly 
will not only significantly sustain the confidence of developing countries in the 
multilateral trading system but will also in the long run benefit the developed countries by 
creating a vibrant and inclusive global economic system. 
3 
Responsible actions needed 
7. Agriculture: We stress that agriculture remains a fundamental and key sector 
for the overwhelming majority of WTO members’ economies and that the successful 
conclusion of the Doha Work Programme negotiations depends largely on the success of 
agriculture negotiations. We look forward to a successful outcome of the negotiations aimed 
at 
substantial improvement in market access in favour of developing countries and the 
elimination 
of all forms of export subsidies and substantial reduction in trade-distorting domestic support. 
We reiterate that special and differential treatment for developing countries shall be an 
integral 
part of the outcome of the negotiations so as to enable them to effectively take account of 
their 
development needs including food security and rural development. We also call for effective 
measures to be undertaken to reverse the decline in agricultural commodity prices, which 
have 
severely affected the economies of many developing countries. 
8. We reaffirm the need for implementation of paragraph 4 of the Marrakesh 
Declaration on Net Food Importing Developing Countries (NFIDCs) and LDCs. 
9. We recognize the need of a safety net to assist the NFIDCs and the LDCs in 
financing short term purchases of major food imports, in times of increasing food import 
bills, 
or if a reduction in good imports at concessional terms makes larger imports necessary. In 
cases of tariff peaks, food imports should be facilitated by reducing tariffs. We call upon all 
potential donors to set long term plans to develop and enhance agricultural infrastructure, 
productivity, and competitiveness of agricultural products in the NFIDCs and the LDCs. 
10. Trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS) and public 
health: We affirm the right of WTO members to use to the full the provisions in the TRIPS 
Agreement which provide flexibility for members to protect public health and promote access 
to medicines for all. In this regard, we underscore the importance of the implementation of 
the 
mechanism to put into effect paragraph 6 of the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health to enable developing countries, including LDCs, with insufficient or no 
manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector to make effective use of compulsory 
licensing. While noting the unilateral initiatives adopted by some members to address this 
issue, any proposed solution in this regard should be multilateral in nature and should be 
agreed 
upon in the context of the WTO. 
11. Implementation issues: We note with great concern the lack of meaningful 
progress on implementation issues, despite a clear decision taken by the Ministers at the 
Fourth 
Ministerial Conference and the mandate of the Doha Ministerial Declaration. We stress the 
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need for full and faithful implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreements for the redress 
of 
existing imbalances arising from the Uruguay Round Agreements, and for addressing 
implementation difficulties faced by developing counties as a matter of priority. 
12. Special and differential treatment (S&D): As mandated by the Ministers in 
paragraphs 44 and 50 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration, we wish to stress once again that 
special and differential treatment for developing countries is an integral part of all WTO 
agreements and must be taken into account in all aspects of the negotiations and be embodied 
in the Schedule of concessions and commitments and as appropriate in the rules and 
disciplines 
to be negotiated, so as to enable developing countries to take account of their development 
4 
needs effectively. We also urge that further progress be made in work towards realizing the 
commitment made in paragraph 44 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration to strengthen the 
S&D 
provisions and to make them more precise, effective and operational. Any outcome reached 
should be meaningful and address the concerns of developing countries. Costs of 
implementation, including adjustment costs of developing countries and newly acceding 
members among them should be fully taken into account in all multilateral agreements. 
13. Market access for non-agricultural products: We call for a full respect for 
the Doha Ministerial Declaration in the formulation of the negotiating modalities on 
nonagricultural 
products, taking into account that the Doha Ministerial Declaration has clearly 
mandated a reduction and as appropriate elimination of tariffs, tariff peaks, high tariffs, tariff 
escalation and non-tariff barriers for all industrial products, in particular products of export 
interest to developing countries. The special needs and interests of developing and least 
developed countries, including the principle of less than full reciprocity in reduction 
commitments, should underpin any modalities that are agreed to in this area of negotiations. 
14. Services: We call for greater efforts to operationalise Article IV of the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services where increased participation of developing countries is 
envisaged, through, inter alia, liberalization of market access in sectors and modes of supply 
of 
export interest to developing countries, particularly mode 4. Negotiations should be 
conducted, 
in accordance with the Guidelines and Procedures for the Negotiations adopted by the 
Council 
for Trade in Services, on the principle of progressive liberalization, at a pace commensurate 
to 
the level of development of developing countries. In addition, we believe that balance should 
be maintained between market access negotiations and multilateral negotiations on rule 
making 
in services that would help create a more favourable framework of negotiations for 
developing 
countries and provide a higher level of comfort in negotiating market access commitments. 
15. Singapore issues: While there remains considerable divergence in views on the 
Singapore issues, we believe that each issue should be treated separately and on its own 
merits. 
Any modalities to be decided, by explicit consensus, would need to provide certainty on the 
structure and precise content of negotiations and must fully take into account the impacts 
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on/and the needs of developing countries. Many developing countries still require further 
analysis to be carried out so as to enable them to better evaluate the implication of closer 
multilateral cooperation for their developmental policies and objectives, and in this context 
the 
provision of technical assistance is necessary. 
16. Electronic commerce: Recognizing that electronic commerce creates new 
challenges and opportunities for trade for WTO members, we stress the importance for 
developing countries of obtaining improved market access opportunities through electronic 
commerce. We consider it necessary to continue the examination of issues under the ongoing 
WTO work programme on electronic commerce, as well as in other international 
organizations. 
We also reaffirm the need to bridge the digital divide and eliminate all restrictions on the 
participation of developing countries in electronic commerce and access to modern 
technologies. 
17. Small economies: We underscore the mandate to examine issues relating to the 
trade of small, vulnerable economies, as recognized in paragraph 35 of the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration. We call on WTO members to complete the Work Programme expeditiously and 
to 
5 
adopt substantive, results-oriented trade-related measures to ensure the fuller integration of 
small, vulnerable economies into the multilateral trading system and to address their specific 
needs. We wish to emphasize the need to take into account the specific concerns of 
landlocked 
developing countries. 
18. Erosion of preferences: We reaffirm the need for WTO members to find 
positive measures to mitigate the negative impact of the erosion of preferences arising out of 
the on-going market access negotiations, including agriculture and non-agriculture market 
access negotiations and, in this context, to address the issue of preference erosion. 
19. Least-developed countries: Recalling paragraph 42 of the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration, we call upon developed countries to make commitments on duty-free and 
quotafree 
market access for all products from LDCs on a secure, long-term and predictable basis 
with realistic, flexible and simplified rules of origin to match the industrial capacity of LDCs. 
In order to effectively integrate LDCs into the multilateral trading system, we further call 
upon 
developed countries to support LDCs in building their trade-related supply capacity, 
including 
through diversification of production and export base. 
20. Accession of developing countries to the WTO: We call on members of the 
WTO to continue to expedite the accession of developing countries to the WTO within a 
transparent, streamlined and accelerated accession process, to speed up the reply procedures, 
and to ensure appropriate assistance in their accession, taking into account their limitations, 
their level of development, and WTO provisions related to the protection of public morals. 
We 
emphasize that the conditions for membership of WTO should be put on a footing similar to 
that of the existing members. We also emphasize the need for acceleration of the accession 
process of LDCs, as per the Accession Guidelines adopted by WTO. 
Steps to be taken 
21. We stress the importance of consistency between national trade policies and 
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multilateral trade agreements. In this regard, we reiterate our concerns and call for the 
elimination of the continuing use of coercive economic and trade measures against 
developing 
countries such as unilateral economic and trade sanctions that are in contradiction with the 
United Nations Charter and WTO rules, as well as the abusive application of anti-dumping, 
technical barriers to trade (TBT) and sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures against 
products originating from developing countries. 
22. While noting the establishment of the Doha Development Agenda Global Trust 
Fund, we urge developed country members of the WTO to increase their contribution to 
capacity building and technical assistance activities for developing and least-developed 
countries in order to strengthen their capacity and develop appropriate infrastructure, 
including 
human resources, to effectively reap the benefits of the multilateral trading system in a 
manner 
compatible with their specific development needs and constraints. 
23. We urge the WTO and its members to continue to cooperate and work with the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) as the focal point within 
the United Nations system for the integrated treatment of trade and development and the 
interrelated issues in the areas of finance, technology, investment and sustainable 
development. 
6 
24. We also urge the WTO to continue to enhance coherence and complementarities 
with other relevant international organizations and the Bretton Woods institutions to promote 
the development objectives of a multilateral trading system responsive to the needs of 
developing countries. 
25. We, the Group of 77 and China, call on the participants of the Fifth WTO 
Ministerial Conference to reaffirm their political commitment made in Doha to foster a new 
spirit of international cooperation based on the principle of shared benefits but differentiated 
responsibilities. 
26. The success of the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference depends largely on a 
genuine spirit of cooperation and the recognition that, in the globalization process, developed 
and developing countries are interdependent. To ensure the eradication of poverty for people 
worldwide, we, both developed and developing countries, must work closely together as 
equal 
partners for development. 
* * * * 
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GROUP OF 77 SOUTH SUMMIT 
Havana, Cuba, 10-14 April 2000 
  
DECLARATION OF THE SOUTH SUMMIT 
1.         We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the 
Group of 77 and China, fully convinced of the imperative need to act in close unity 
for the primary purpose of working for a peaceful and prosperous world, have 
gathered here in Havana, for the first-ever South Summit, from 12 to 14 April 2000. 
2.         We remain fully committed to the spirit of the Group of 77 and China, which 
has helped our countries since the inception of the Group in the early 1960s to 
pursue a common and constructive course of action for the protection and 
promotion of our collective interests and genuine international cooperation for 
development. At this historic event, we reaffirm our commitment to the principles 
and objectives that have guided the Group from the start. We also rededicate 
ourselves to strengthening the unity and solidarity of the Group in pursuit of its 
declared objectives and to reinforcing the role it is called-upon to play in 
international economic relations. 
3.         We are fully convinced that it is indeed imperative to gather here at the start 
of the new millennium, a critical juncture in contemporary human history, to reflect 
on the rapidly changing world economic situation and to discuss the emerging 
challenges facing the South in the economic and social spheres and seek a solution 
to them. We have also been brought together fully convinced that at the dawn of the 
21st century, we need to act decisively to map out a better future for our countries 
and peoples and to work towards the establishment of an international economic 
system which will be just and democratic.  
4.         We reaffirm that in our endeavours we are guided by all the principles and 
purposes of the United Nations Charter and by full respect for the principles of 
international law. To this end we uphold the principles of sovereignty and sovereign 
equality of States, territorial integrity and non intervention in the internal affairs of 
any State; take effective measures for the suppression of acts of aggression or 
other breaches of peace and encourage the settlement of international disputes by 
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, 
are not endangered; refrain in international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other 
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manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations; develop friendly 
relations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self determination of 
peoples; achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an 
economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, and in promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.  
5.         We emphasize that the process of globalization and interdependence must 
not be used to weaken or re-interpret the above-mentioned principles, which 
continue to be the foundation for friendly and peaceful relations among States and 
for the solution of disputes and conflicts by peaceful means. Furthermore, we stress 
that those principles inspire us to be fully committed to creating a more just and 
equitable international economic system that offers security for all people and 
growing opportunities to raise their standard of living.  
6.         We are committed to a global system based on the rule of law, democracy 
in decision-making and full respect for the principles of international law and the 
Charter of the United Nations. The new global system must reflect these principles. 
7.         We emphasize that development is the best contribution to peace, and that 
both are built together. Development is a continuing process, without arbitrary 
limits, through which we work for the prosperity and well-being of our peoples. Our 
highest priority is to overcome underdevelopment, which implies the eradication of 
hunger, illiteracy, disease and poverty. Although this is primarily our responsibility, 
we urge the international community to adopt urgent and resolute actions, with a 
comprehensive and multidimensional approach, to assist in overcoming these 
scourges, and to establish international economic relations based on justice and 
equity.  Development for the well-being of our peoples will always remain the focus 
of action of the Group of 77, and in this respect we rededicate ourselves to that 
goal.  We recognize the right of developing countries, in exercise of their 
sovereignty and without any interference in their internal affairs, to choose the path 
of development in accordance with their national priorities and objectives.  We are, 
however, deeply concerned that international cooperation for development has 
been downplayed on the agenda of the international community, including the 
United Nations system.  In view of our declared goal, we therefore call on the 
international community at the dawn of the new millennium to give priority to the 
development agenda of developing countries and adopt urgent and resolute actions 
which will help them to overcome the obstacles to their development objectives.  
8.         In this context, and noting the interdependence of nations and the varying 
levels of human development worldwide, we stress the need for a new global 
human order aimed at reversing the growing disparities between rich and poor, both 
among and within countries, through the promotion of growth with equity, the 
eradication of poverty, the expansion of productive employment and the promotion 
of gender equality and social integration. We therefore, pledge to work together to 
confront these challenges for the benefits of all our people.  
9.         We note that in recent decades, external factors have constrained the 
realization of the economic potential of the South. This has adversely affected 
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external trade and the flow of foreign direct investments (FDI) and other forms of 
investments. It is thus, imperative to promote a North-South dialogue based on a 
spirit of partnership, mutual benefit and genuine interdependence in order to 
expedite the removal of these constraints.  
10.       We are deeply convinced of the need to create a new spirit of international 
cooperation based on the principle of achieving shared benefits, but also based on 
common but differentiated responsibilities, between the developing and 
industrialized countries. We concur that in order to do this, it is imperative to 
develop collective and peaceful solutions for the global problems affecting the world 
today, and this demands a search for concrete mechanisms that will guarantee full 
and effective participation by the South in international decision-making, on an 
equal basis. In this regard, the international machinery through which global norms 
are developed and actions taken must therefore ensure that the countries of the 
South can participate on an equal footing in decisions which affect them most of all. 
In particular, the international economic governance institutions must promote 
broad based decision-making which is essential if we are to have a more equitable 
global political economy. In the context of interdependence we underline the need 
for expeditions measures to make the existing mechanisms more transparent, 
inclusive, participatory, interactive and broad based.  Similarly at the national level, 
we also note that the efforts to promote development require a true partnership that 
is more inclusive and participatory and which involves all stakeholders, including 
the private sector and NGOs.  
11.       We note with concern that the countries of the South have not been able to 
share in the benefits of globalization on an equal footing with the developed 
countries and have been excluded from the benefits of this process.  Asymmetries 
and imbalances have intensified in international economic relations, particularly with 
regard to international cooperation, even further widening the gap between the 
developing countries and the industrialized countries. We are also concerned that, 
in the context of widening North-South gap, the social and economic conditions of 
the least developed countries (LDCs) have been deteriorating. Furthermore, the 
income gap within countries remains wide; social exclusion and inequalities are 
widespread; and the number of people living in poverty has increased. Urgent 
measures should be taken to address the needs of the large majorities of the 
population, in particular women and children, who are forced to live in extreme 
poverty, if this is not done, globalization will provide no lasting solutions to the 
essential problems of developing countries. For most of us, agriculture remains the 
mainstay of our economies, and the majority of our population still lives in rural 
areas; globalization has passed them by, but must address their needs.  
12.       We are concerned by the serious financial problems faced by many of our 
countries, with the systemic aspect of financial instability, the problems associated 
with excessive volatility in short-term capital flows, and the absence of an 
appropriate mechanism to regulate and monitor such flows, as well as hedge funds, 
and highly leveraged financial institutions. This situation urgently requires a 
fundamental reform of the international financial architecture, making it more 
democratic, more transparent and better attuned to solving the problems of 
development. It also requires the establishment of a clear programme that goes 
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beyond the mere prevention of crises and includes actions addressing the 
interrelated problems of finance, trade, technology and development at the 
international level.  The return to apparent normalcy of capital markets after the last 
crises should not lull us into complacency.  
13.       Even developing countries with limited or no financial markets suffer badly 
from  financial volatility and contagion through lower commodity prices brought 
about by declining commodity demand,  cross-instability  in financial and commodity 
markets, and  the postponement of investment, which seriously weaken their overall 
economic situation and growth potential.  Although financial contagion in these 
countries does not have systemic consequences, their economies are severely 
affected, and we therefore call on the multilateral financial institutions to take 
appropriate and timely supportive action to assist them.  
14.       As the focal point within the United Nations for the integrated treatment of 
trade and development and the interrelated issues in the areas of finance, 
technology, investment and sustainable development, UNCTAD should continue to 
examine these issues and to build a consensus for the reformulation of policies and 
options on globalization from a development perspective.   We strongly reaffirm our 
commitment to the mandate  given to UNCTAD  at Bangkok  to contribute  to the 
ongoing process of reforms of the international financial institutions.  
15.       We recognize the need for our countries to continue with their efforts 
towards economic reforms to enhance sustained economic growth and sustainable 
development.  We also urge the developed countries to take into account the 
possible negative impact of their domestic economic, monetary and fiscal policies 
on developing countries and to apply measures that are sensitive to the needs and 
interests of the South.  
16.       The world has become more interdependent than ever before.  The 
persistence of endemic poverty and deprivation in the South constitutes a potential 
threat to the security and prosperity  of the world.  In this context we welcome the 
initiative launched for the creation of the World Solidarity Fund and encourage 
efforts by member States for its establishment. We underline the importance of this 
Fund in contributing to the efforts in the eradication of poverty.  
17.       We advocate the restoration of confidence in the multilateral trading system, 
which should contribute to the economic growth and development of the countries 
of the South. We insist on the need for the developed countries to fulfil their 
commitments fully and immediately to implement the provisions for special and 
differential treatment for the products and services exported by the developing 
countries, and for the strengthening of the system of trade preferences, which 
should also address the needs of LDCs and the specificities of a number of small 
developing countries, while taking into consideration their problems of vulnerability 
and the risk of marginalization in the global economy.  We urge that priority should 
be given to the liberalization of those service sectors where developing countries 
have the comparative advantage.  In this respect, the key issue of the free 
movement of natural persons should be adequately addressed.  
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18.       We note with concern that the liberalization of international trade has not 
provided benefits for all developing countries.  There is a need to restore 
confidence in the multilateral trading system through full participation of developing 
countries, full and faithful implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreements in 
their true spirit, and effective attention to the implementation concerns of developing 
countries.  We stress the principle of universal membership of the WTO and call for 
acceleration of the accession process without political conditionalities..  We urge all 
WTO members to refrain from placing excessive demands on developing countries 
seeking accession to WTO.  We recognize that there is a need for consultations 
among developing countries to promote effective participation in the WTO.  
19.       We welcome the invitation extended by the State of Qatar to host the Fourth 
Ministerial Conference of the WTO, and we call for an effective participation in this 
conference so as to achieve the goals and promote the interests of the countries of 
the South.  
20.       We underline the urgent need to redress the imbalances in the present 
WTO Agreements, and in particular, with regard to the right of developing countries 
to promote their exports, which have been curtailed by the abuse of such 
protectionist measures as anti-dumping actions and countervailing duties, as well 
as tariff peaks and escalation. Meaningful and expedited liberalization of the textiles 
sector, which is of particular interest to developing countries, is another important 
market access issue which should be addressed by the multilateral trading system 
as a matter of priority.  We also call for the mandated negotiations on agriculture in 
accordance with the provisions of article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture. In 
agriculture the objectives should be to incorporate the sector within normal WTO 
rules.  We also call for the full and prompt implementation of the WTO Marrakech  
decision on measures related to the possible negative effects of the reform 
programme on Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and net food importing 
developing countries. The WTO Agreements should be implemented taking into 
consideration the need to extend the implementation period of particular 
Agreements that pose problems to developing countries. The review of Trade-
related Aspect of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS) as mandated in 
articles 27 and 71 should make them more responsive to the needs of the South 
and to ensure access of developing countries to knowledge and technology on 
preferential terms. We will work towards harmonizing the TRIPS Agreement with 
the provisions of the sustainable use and conservation of biodiversity in the 
Convention on Biological Diversity. 
21.       We also call upon developed countries fully to implement special and 
differential treatment (SDT) for developing countries, to strengthen the system of 
preferences and to give the products and services of special export interest to 
developing countries free and fair access to their markets.  In this connection, we 
urge all WTO members to grant the request of the European Union and the ACP 
Group for a waiver for the provisions of article 1, paragraph 1, of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).  We call upon the developed partners also 
to recognize the need to formulate appropriate measures to address the concerns 
of other eligible countries through strengthening the Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP).  Future multilateral trade negotiations should be based on a 
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positive agenda and should take full consideration of the development dimension of 
trade and of the specific needs and concerns of developing countries.  We call on 
all countries to support the mandate of the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) to assist developing countries in multilateral trade 
negotiations by providing sufficient resources.  While recognizing the value of 
environmental protection, labour standards, intellectual property protection, 
indigenous innovation and local community, sound macroeconomic management 
and promotion and protection of all universally recognized human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, including the right to development, and the treatment of 
each issue in its competent international organization, we reject all attempts to use 
these issues as conditionalities for restricting market access or aid and technology 
flows to developing countries.  
22.       We have assessed the successful results of the recently held UNCTAD X 
Conference in Bangkok, Thailand, and request all countries duly to support the 
organization in its efforts to contribute to the promotion of the development 
dimensions of trade in the context of globalization and of the liberalization of the 
world economy. 
23.       We further believe that the member countries of the Group of 77 should 
coordinate their priorities and negotiating strategies effectively to promote their 
common interests by shaping and directing multilateral trade negotiations to take 
into account the needs of developing countries so that trade policies serve the 
objectives of development, and also provide enhanced market access to developing 
countries.  
24.       We note with deep concern the continuing decline of official development 
assistance, (ODA) which has adversely affected development activities in the 
developing countries, in particular the LDCs, and we therefore urge developed 
countries that have not yet done so to act immediately to honour their commitment 
of directing 0.7 per cent of their Gross National Product (GNP) to ODA, and within 
that target, to earmark 0.15 per cent to 0.20 per cent for the LDCs. We also urge 
that the provision of official aid should respect the national development priorities of 
developing countries, and that conditions attached to ODA should be brought to an 
end.   
25.       We support the holding of a high-level United Nations conference on 
financing for development in the year 2001, which should address national, 
international and systemic issues relating to financing for development in a holistic 
manner.  We call on all countries and relevant stakeholders, particularly the World 
Bank, IMF and WTO, to attach the greatest urgency and importance and to 
participate actively in the preparatory process and in the conference itself.  We also 
welcome the offers by Indonesia and Colombia to holding regional 
intergovernmental meetings in order to provide inputs for the preparatory process 
for the event.  In this regard, we invite the member States of the Group of 77 to 
consider offering to host the conference.  
26.       We note with concern the persistence of the external debt problem and its 
unfortunate consequences in the South, where the vicious cycle of debt and 
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underdevelopment has become even further entrenched. We are alarmed at the 
fact that debt servicing has grown at a much greater rate than the debt itself, and 
that the burden of debt payments has become heavier in many countries of the 
South, including countries with low and middle incomes. We therefore underline the 
need collectively to pursue a durable solution for the external debt problem of 
developing countries, including middle-income developing countries, which also 
addresses the structural causes of indebtedness. We further call for debt reduction 
arrangements for middle-income developing countries in order to expedite the 
release of resources for development.  
27.       We welcome the expanded initiative in favour of heavily indebted poor 
countries (HIPC), but consider that it should be extended, expedited and made 
more flexible, and that new and supplementary resources should be contributed. 
Debt relief or cancellation should not be at the expense of official development 
assistance. We advocate seeking renegotiation formulas applicable to middle-
income countries, and promote the design of a global strategy for external debt, 
which addresses the interrelated problems of finance, the economy and 
development.  
28.       We note with grave concern the debt burden, which has put the least 
developed countries in a more vulnerable position, and urge the developed 
countries to write off their debt so as to relieve the LDCs of the burden and thereby 
strengthen their capacity to develop and to escape from the vicious circle of 
poverty.  
29.       We view with alarm the recent unilateral moves by some developed 
countries to question the use of fiscal policy as a development tool and to impose 
their own definition of so-called harmful tax competition. We reiterate the 
fundamental right of each State to determine its own fiscal policies and in this 
regard sovereignty of States must be respected. We subscribe to the view that the 
legitimate struggle against money laundering should not be used as a pretext to 
discredit genuine offshore financial centres because of their fiscal policies and 
incentives.  
30.       The contribution of the transnational corporations (TNCs) to sustained 
economic growth and sustainable development is determined by their global 
strategies, characterized by the search for increased competitiveness and ever-
higher profits.  Such a situation is not necessarily consistent with job creation and 
the realization of development objectives in many developing countries.  Hence, we 
invite the relevant international institutions to address this dilemma with a view to 
attaining the proper balance between both objectives.  In this context, we request 
UNCTAD and ILO, within their respective mandates, to study the merger trend 
among the TNCs and its impact on unemployment as well as its competitiveness 
impact on Small and Medium-sized (SMEs) in developing countries.  We also call 
on the TNCs to integrate development objectives of the host developing countries 
into their business strategies.  
31.       We recognize that within the South, there are a group of countries, 
categorized as LDCs, which are at a particular disadvantage in the current phase of 
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globalization and liberalization.  Despite the efforts they are making and the 
attempts being made to help them, they continue to be marginalized in the world 
economy.  We urge the international community to take special initiatives for them, 
particularly in regard to the eradication of poverty, equitable implementation of the 
WTO Agreements, free access to their exports in the world markets, debt 
cancellation, increased ODA, and incentives for FDI flows to the LDCs.  
32.       We reiterate our support for the initiative of the Group of 77 on the 
resolution entitled “Prevention of corrupt practices and illegal transfer of funds”, 
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its 54th session.  We support 
the demands in that resolution on the need for increasing cooperation at various 
levels, including the United Nations system, to devise ways and means of 
preventing and addressing the illegal transfer of funds and repatriation of illegally 
transferred funds to countries of origin.  We also endorse the decision of the African 
and European leaders who, at the end of their recent summit in Cairo, resolved to 
take the necessary measures to combat corruption at both the national and 
international levels and to ensure that illegally acquired and transferred monies 
deposited in foreign banks are investigated and returned to countries of origin.  We 
call on all countries and entities concerned to cooperate in this regard.  We also call 
on the United Nations to commence preparatory work for the elaboration of a 
convention on this matter, to be submitted to the Millennium Assembly for adoption.
33.       We recognize the special problems of small and vulnerable economies and 
encourage the relevant international institutions to take into account differences in 
the level of development and size of the economies of developing countries in order 
to create opportunities for full participation of the small economies and to increase 
their level of development.  We insist that SDT for all developing countries, 
including small and vulnerable economies, should be recognized as a fundamental 
principle of the multilateral trading system.  
34.       We have recognized the handicaps faced by landlocked developing 
countries due to unfavorable geographic circumstances, and the concerns of transit 
developing countries. In the global economy the landlocked developing countries 
are being increasingly marginalized despite efforts on their part to devise 
appropriate  national strategies. This is resulting in the further deterioration of their 
economies and already low living standards. We urge bilateral and multilateral 
donors to grant preferential treatment to landlocked and transit developing 
countries. 
35.       We are concerned by the special problems and vulnerabilities of small 
island developing states (SIDS), in particular the lack of market access and 
absence of special and differential treatment, which continue to create barriers for 
these countries to participate effectively in a rapidly globalizing world economy. We 
express concern that, although great efforts have been undertaken by the SIDS at 
the national level, there has not been commensurate support at the international 
level. We call for the strengthening of efforts at the international level in the 
implementation and follow-up of the Barbados Programme of Action. We 
emphasize the urgent need to maximize international support through, inter alia, 
strengthening the existing institutional agreements, mobilizing new, additional and 
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external resources, and improving coordination mechanisms so as to focus and 
harmonize support for SIDS priorities. We note the regular incidence of natural 
disasters and their deleterious effects on the development of small and vulnerable 
economies and call for increasing international assistance for setting up and 
strengthening national, subregional, regional and international disaster prevention, 
preparedness and management mechanisms, including early warning systems, 
taking into account particularly the work accomplished during the International 
Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction.  
36.       We express our deep concern over the unprecedented floods in Southern 
Africa, and Mozambique in particular, that have caused loss of life, extensive 
destruction of infrastructures, deterioration of the socioeconomic situation and 
dislodgment and scattering of landmines.  The unfolding humanitarian disaster is a 
further cause of concern.  We commend the efforts of the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) countries to address the devastating effects of 
the floods and thank the international community for the support, solidarity and 
humanitarian assistance rendered to Mozambique.  We urge the international 
community to participate in the International Donors Conference to be held in Rome 
on 3-4 May 2000, aimed at mobilizing financial resources for the reconstruction of 
socioeconomic infrastructures and rehabilitation of the victims in Mozambique.  We 
also urge the developed countries to write off the external debt of Mozambique in 
the light of its current critical socioeconomic situation.  We further urge the 
international community to increase its assistance to mine clearance programmes, 
taking into account the far-reaching effects of the floods.  
37.       We are deeply alarmed about the persistent critical economic situation in 
Africa, exacerbated inter alia by a heavy debt burden, low levels of savings and 
investment, depressed commodity prices, declining levels of ODA, and insufficient 
levels of FDI. In particular we note with dismay that poverty in Africa has now 
reached intolerable levels, with negative consequences for the stability of most 
countries and regions of the continent.  In order to reach internationally agreed 
targets of reducing poverty by half by the year 2015, African economies must grow 
at a rate of 7 per cent  per annum. Present trends must therefore be reversed, 
starting with the writing off of bilateral and multilateral debts and a substantial 
increase in financial flows, including ODA. This would enable African countries to 
resume much-needed investment in human and physical infrastructure, a sine qua 
non for putting the continent back on the road to growth and development.  In this 
context, we welcome the initiatives taken by some developed countries to write off 
the debts of LDCs and also welcome the Declaration and Plan of Action which 
emanated from the first Africa-Europe Summit, held in Cairo from 3 to 4 April 2000, 
and which examined ways and means to increase the integration of Africa into the 
world economy by elaborating a comprehensive solution to its debt problem, 
improving its productive and financial capacities, removing market access and 
supply-side obstacles to the flow of its exports to the international markets, and 
assisting its efforts to attract a larger share of world investment. We therefore urge 
the speedy implementation of measures supporting the development efforts of 
African countries.  
38.       We are deeply concerned about the spread of HIV/AIDS and of parasitic 
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diseases in developing countries in general and sub-Saharan Africa in particular.  
The scourge threatens to undermine great advances achieved in the social and 
economic fields in developing countries over the past decade.  We urge the 
international community to adopt concrete measures to mitigate the disastrous 
effects of HIV/AIDS, including by encouraging local production and ensuring access 
to drugs at affordable costs.  Urgent assistance is needed, particularly to intensify 
information and awareness campaigns to make the causes of the disease and 
preventive measures well known to the masses.  We call for the support of the 
international community to assist in addressing the challenge posed by HIV/AIDS in 
particular, but by all diseases in general, such as lack of adequate access to care 
and treatment for HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria epidemics.  Policies to realize 
gender equality must be implemented with greater urgency in order to help combat 
one of the root causes of the spread of the disease.  We also call for international 
cooperation, including South-South cooperation, and the establishment of multi-
disciplinary mechanisms at regional and subregional levels to address these 
challenges.  
39.       We call for the design of investment promotion policies that correspond to 
national priorities for development, including capacity-building, technology transfer, 
infrastructure, the expansion of production facilities, job creation, and the 
diversification of exports and markets. The international community should support 
the efforts of developing countries to define FDI strategies for the creation of a 
favourable climate for investment.  
40.       We are convinced that South-South cooperation is an effective instrument 
for optimizing our potential to promote development through, among other things, 
mobilization and sharing of existing resources and expertise in our countries, as 
well as complementing cooperation programme with donor countries. We therefore 
commit ourselves to overcoming whatever factors that have limited this 
cooperation.  We believe such cooperation is imperative in the context of 
globalization and that it should therefore it should be pursued with determination 
and political will.  We also believe that South-South cooperation is an essential 
mechanism for promoting sustained economic growth and sustainable development 
and that it constitutes a vital element in promoting constructive South-South 
relations and in achieving self-reliance.  In view of the foregoing we reiterate our 
determination to take necessary measures, including the identification of resources 
and the design of appropriate follow-up mechanisms to exploit its potential fully.  
41.       In this regard, we commend and support recent initiatives taken by our 
countries to promote cooperation between Africa and Latin America and the 
Caribbean, as well as between Africa and Asia, as contained in cooperation 
agreements, to address issues of desertification, drought and land degradation in 
joint efforts to implement the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, 
particularly in Africa.  We reaffirm our commitment for the full implementation of all 
the provisions of the Convention and call on developed countries and the 
international community to fulfil their financial commitments in this regard.  We also 
support the decisions adopted at the African Ministerial Conference on 
Environment, held in Abuja, Nigeria, on 4-6 April 2000, and welcome the recent 
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establishment in Tunisia of the observatory of the Sahel and Sahara.  
42.       We recognize that regional cooperation and integration is the most 
meaningful approach for the South to face the challenges of globalization and take 
full advantage of its opportunities.  We also commend and support the work of the 
regional and subregional groupings established among developing countries to 
promote the sustainable socioeconomic development of their respective member 
States through regional integration and the harmonization of their economic and 
social policies.  We further welcome and encourage the establishment of 
appropriate structures at the regional and subregional levels in the developing 
countries aimed at removing barriers to the free movement of goods, services and 
capital.  
43.       We note that the prevailing gap between the North and South in the 
scientific and technological field is still growing, and that the process of rapid 
accumulation of knowledge and technologies has not reached the hundreds of 
millions of people who continue to live in absolute poverty. It is essential to adopt 
appropriate measures to overcome the technological gap between the developing 
and industrialized countries and to work towards arrangements that facilitate the 
processes of technology transfer. While we are committed to promoting the 
development of science and technology by strengthening our political will, 
increasing the allocation of resources to that end, developing an appropriate 
institutional framework, and promoting technology and innovation through 
advanced, quality education, we urge developed countries to facilitate the transfer 
of technology, easing the costs and collateral conditions that presently stand in its 
way.  
44.       We believe that the prevailing modes of production and consumption in the 
industrialized countries are unsustainable and should be changed, for they threaten 
the very survival of the planet. We firmly believe that technological innovations 
should be systematically evaluated in terms of their economic, social and 
environmental impact, with the participation of all the social sectors involved, 
including the business community, Governments, the scientific community, and 
other groups that have not traditionally been part of this process. We call on the 
developed countries to fulfil their commitment to provide developing countries with 
financial resources and environmentally sound technologies on a preferential basis. 
45.       We advocate a solution for the serious global, regional and local 
environmental problems facing humanity, based on the recognition of the North’s 
ecological debt and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities of the 
developed and developing countries. 
46.       We recognize that information technology constitutes one of the pillars of 
technological revolution and represents one of the most powerful development tools 
of our time. We should take full advantage of this unique opportunity to use 
information technology for development and to ensure that its benefits reach our 
people, as the future of the South depends on the inclusion of information 
technology in its economic and social development programmes. In this context, we 
underline the need to establish global knowledge partnerships that include 
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encourage to developed countries to provide developing countries with the 
necessary assistance. 
47.       While we believe it is urgent to enhance our access to global information 
networks and to improve the benefits derived therefrom, we also emphasize the 
need to preserve our national and regional diversity of traditions, identities and 
cultures which may be affected by the globalization process, and to achieve a 
connection to contemporary international information and knowledge that does not 
entail sacrificing our national and regional cultures and identities. It is thus, it is 
necessary to pay special attention to the homogenizing tendencies that may 
threaten this diversity. In this context, we welcome the proclamation by the United 
Nations General Assembly of the year 2001 as the Year of Dialogue among 
Civilizations and stress the importance of this initiative as a means of enhancing 
understanding of diverse cultures and promoting North-South and South-South 
cooperation in a globalized world.  
48.       We firmly reject the imposition of laws and regulations with extraterritorial 
impact and all other forms of coercive economic measures, including unilateral 
sanctions against developing countries, and reiterate the urgent need to eliminate 
them immediately. We emphasize that such actions not only undermine the 
principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and international law, but 
also severely threaten the freedom of trade and investment. We therefore, we call 
on the international community neither to recognize these measures nor apply 
them.  
49.       We are committed to promoting democracy and strengthening the rule of 
law.  We will promote respect for all universally recognized human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, including the right to development.  We pledge ourselves to 
provide transparent, effective and accountable governance, responsive to the 
needs of our peoples, which is necessary for economic growth, peace and 
prosperity.  We reaffirm that every State has the inalienable right to choose political, 
economic, social and cultural systems of its own, without interference in any form 
by other States.  
50.       We express grave concern over the impact of economic sanctions on the 
development capacity in the targeted countries, in this context noting that Libya has 
now fulfilled all its obligations in terms of pertinent Security Council resolutions, and 
we urge the Security Council to adopt a resolution completely lifting the sanctions 
against Libya.  We also call for the immediate lifting of all unilateral sanctions 
imposed against Libya outside of the United Nations system.  
51.       We affirm that bringing an end to the Israeli occupation and establishing a 
comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East is a prerequisite for 
economic and social development in the region. We reaffirm our support for the 
Middle East peace process on the basis of Security Council resolutions 242 (1967), 
338 (1973) and 425 (1978) and the principle of land for peace. Peace demands 
complete Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Palestinian territory, including 
Jerusalem, and the achievement of a final settlement by the agreed-upon deadline 
of September 2000, as well as the establishment of the State of Palestine with 
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Jerusalem as its capital. It also demands complete Israeli withdrawal from the 
occupied Syrian Golan and the demarcation of the 4 June 1967 line, as well as the 
unconditional withdrawal from South Lebanon and Western Bekaa to the 
internationally recognized boundaries. We affirm that measures taken by Israel 
aimed at changing the legal status and the demographic composition of Jerusalem 
are null and void.  
52.       We call on all States in areas of conflict to refrain from attacks against 
civilian infrastructures, and consider the attacks on such targets as contrary to 
international law and detrimental to the pursuit of national economic and social 
development and to international trade.  
53.       We also express our deep concern over the air attack against the El-Shifa 
Pharmaceuticals Factory in the Sudan on 20 August 1998, and its negative impact 
on that country’s economic and social development. We express our support and 
solidarity with the Sudan for its demand for a just and fair consideration of the 
matter by the United Nations on the basis of international law.  
54.       We stress the need to maintain a clear distinction between humanitarian assistance 
and other activities of the United Nations. We reject the so-called “right” of humanitarian 
intervention, which has no legal basis in the United Nations Charter or in the general 
principles of international law. In this context, we request the Chairman of the Group of 77, 
in conjunction with the Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), through the Joint 
Coordinating Committee, (JCC), to coordinate consideration of the concept of humanitarian 
intervention and other related matters as contained in the 1999 Report of the United 
Nations Secretary-General on the work of the Organization. We further stress the need for 
scrupulously respecting the guiding principles of humanitarian assistance, adopted by the 
General Assembly in its resolution 46/182, and emphasize that these principles are valid, 
time-tested and must continue to be fully observed. Furthermore, we stress that 
humanitarian assistance should be conducted in full respect of the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity, and political independence of host countries, and should be initiated in response 
to a request or with the approval of these States.  
55.       We call upon the international community to provide the necessary 
assistance to landmine clearance operations, as well as to the rehabilitation of the 
victims and their social and economic integration into the landmine affected 
countries. We express concern over the residues of the Second World War, in 
particular in the form of landmines which cause human and material damage and 
obstruct development plans in some developing countries. We demand that the 
States responsible for laying the mines outside of their territories assume 
responsibility for the landmines,  cooperate with the affected countries to get rid of 
them, and contribute defraying the costs of clearance and provide compensation for 
any ensuing losses and for reclaiming the affected areas for productive purposes.  
56.       We also express dismay at the increasing number of children involved in 
and affected by armed conflict.  We call upon the international community to take 
concerted action to prevent and stop the use of children in armed conflicts and to 
assist in the rehabilitation of those affected children, as they are the future 
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generation who would otherwise be able to contribute meaningfully to development.
57.       We note with deep concern the increase of all kinds of criminal activities, 
including illicit traffic of arms, drugs and other products which are used to foster and 
finance organized crimes and all types of transnational crimes which continue to be 
a major factor of instability and a threat to development. In this context we are also 
deeply concerned by the trafficking of women and children, which is not only an 
offense against human dignity, but also a violation of International Law.  We call 
upon all countries to join the multilateral effort of the international community to 
develop mechanisms that will strengthen cooperation in terms of prevention and 
elimination of these activities, so that the stability and prosperity of all economies 
and societies can be guaranteed. 
58.       We have appraised the importance of the Millennium Summit, and reaffirm 
the need for the Group of 77 and the NAM to duly coordinate their positions. In this 
regard, we endorse the proposal of the Joint Coordinating Committee that within the 
overall theme of the interactive debate being held at the South Summit on the role 
of the United Nations in the 21st century, there should be two subthemes, namely, 
“Peace, security and disarmament” and “ Development and poverty eradication”, 
and emphasize the need for developing countries to coordinate their positions to 
ensure, that their common interests and positions on every aspect of the two 
subthemes are fully reflected in the outcome of the Summit.  
59.       We welcome the decision to convene a special session of the General 
Assembly in the year 2001 to review the implementation of the Programme of 
Action of the World Children Summit, and express our commitment to participate 
fully in the preparatory process for the special session with a view to improving the 
lives of children in our countries.  We are concerned that economic and social 
marginalization of developing countries, especially the poorest nations, is having a 
deleterious impact on children.  
60.       In this context, we express our deep concern over the insufficient level of 
resources for development at the disposal of the United Nations, thus hindering its 
capacity to fulfil its main economic and social objectives in a manner commensurate 
with the needs and aspirations of the developing countries. We note with concern 
the increasing erosion of the role and the contribution of the United Nations to the 
promotion of genuine international cooperation for development. In this regard, we 
reiterate that the United Nations has a central role to play in world economic 
matters by promoting a vital boost to the development of the South and by 
transforming international economic relations, making them more fair and equitably 
and pledge our full support and determination to working towards its strengthening 
in this regard.  
61.       We believe that in order to realize the goal of universal peace and 
prosperity, we will need to promote international cooperation that is just and 
equitable, giving high priority to integrated and comprehensive development, which 
can be achieved only by working together, both among ourselves and with the 
developed countries. We can make ourselves heard as a single voice, with the 
courage, perseverance, boldness and political will needed for the major and urgent 
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transformations of the international economic system to which we all aspire.  
62.       In adopting this Declaration, we recognize the need for an action-oriented 
programme of practical solutions to be implemented within a specific timeframe.  To guide 
us in this process, we adopt the Havana Programme of Action. The Chairman of the Group 
of 77 is requested to forward this Declaration and the Programme of Action to the President 
of United Nations General Assembly in order to be circulated as official documents of the 
Millennium Summit and the Millennium Assembly.  
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